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2439th MEETING

Held in New York on Monday, 23 May 1983, at 3.30 p.m.

President: Mr. M. KAMANDA wa KAMANDA (Zaire).

Present: The representatives of the following States: China, France, Guyana, Jordan, Malta, Netherlands, Nicaragua, Pakistan, Poland, Togo, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Zaire, Zimbabwe.

Provisional agenda (S/Agenda/2439)

1. Adoption of the agenda

2. The situation in Namibia:
   Letter dated 12 May 1983 from the Permanent Representative of Mauritius to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/15760);
   Letter dated 13 May 1983 from the Permanent Representative of India to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/15761)

The meeting was called to order at 4.10 p.m.

Adoption of the agenda

The agenda was adopted.

The situation in Namibia:
Letter dated 12 May 1983 from the Permanent Representative of Mauritius to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/15760);
Letter dated 13 May 1983 from the Permanent Representative of India to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/15761)

1. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): I should like to inform the members of the Council that I have received letters from the representatives of Algeria, Angola, Australia, Bangladesh, Benin, Cuba, Egypt, Ethiopia, the Gambia, Guinea, India, Indonesia, Jamaica, Kuwait, Mali, Mauritius, Nigeria, Panama, Romania, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Sri Lanka, the Syrian Arab Republic, Tunisia, Turkey, Yugoslavia and Zambia, in which they request to be invited to participate in the discussion of the item on the agenda. In conformity with the usual practice, I propose, with the consent of the Council, to invite those representatives to participate in the discussion without the right to vote, in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Charter and rule 37 of the provisional rules of procedure.

At the invitation of the President, Mr. Maudave (Mauritius) took a place at the Council table; Mr. Sahnoun (Algeria), Mr. de Figueiredo (Angola), Mr. Joseph (Australia), Mr. Wasiuddin (Bangladesh), Mr. Adjibade (Benin), Mr. Roa Kourí (Cuba), Mr. Khalil (Egypt), Mr. Ibrahim (Ethiopia), Mr. Blain (Gambia), Mr. Coumbassa (Guinea), Mr. Rao (India), Mr. Djalal (Indonesia), Sir Egerton Richardson (Jamaica), Mr. Abulhassan (Kuwait), Mr. Traore (Mali), Mr. Fafowora (Nigeria), Mr. Ozores Typaldos (Panama), Mr. Marinescu (Romania), Mr. Niasse (Senegal), Ms. Gonthier (Seychelles), Mr. Sallu (Sierra Leone), Mr. von Schirnding (South Africa), Mr. Fonseka (Sri Lanka), Mr. El-Fattal (Syrian Arab Republic), Mr. Slim (Tunisia), Mr. Kirca (Turkey), Mr. Golob (Yugoslavia) and Mr. Goma (Zambia) took the places reserved for them at the side of the Council Chamber.

2. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): I should like to inform the members of the Council that I have received a letter dated 19 May from the President of the United Nations Council for Namibia, which reads as follows:

> "On behalf of the United Nations Council for Namibia, I have the honour, under rule 39 of the provisional rules of procedure of the Security Council, to request an invitation to the delegation of the United Nations Council for Namibia, headed by me, to participate in the Security Council's consideration of the item entitled 'The situation in Namibia' which begins on 23 May 1983. The other members of the delegation to these forthcoming meetings of the Security Council are: Mr. Ignac Golob (Yugoslavia), Mr. Tuluy Tanç (Turkey), Mr. Madjid Bouguerra (Algeria) and Miss Elaine V. Jacob (Guyana)."

3. On previous occasions the Security Council has extended invitations to representatives of other United Nations bodies in connection with the consideration of matters on its agenda. In accordance with past practice, therefore, I propose that the Council extend an invitation pursuant to rule 39 of its provisional rules of procedure to the President of the United Nations Council for Namibia and the delegation of the Council.

At the invitation of the President, Mr. Lusaka (President of the United Nations Council for Namibia) and the other members of the delegation took places at the Council table.

4. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): I should like to inform the members of the Council that I

have received a letter dated 18 May from the Acting Chairman of the Special Committee against *Apartheid*, which reads as follows:

> "I have the honour to request the Council to permit Mr. Mohamed Sahnoun, representative of Algeria, to participate, on behalf of the Chairman of the Special Committee against *Apartheid*, under the provisions of rule 39 of the Council's provisional rules of procedure, in the Council's consideration of the item entitled 'The situation in Namibia'."

50. On previous occasions the Security Council has extended invitations to representatives of other United Nations bodies in connection with the consideration of matters on its agenda. In accordance with past practice, therefore, I propose that the Council extend an invitation pursuant to rule 39 of its provisional rules of procedure to Mr. Mohamed Sahnoun, representative of the Chairman of the Special Committee against *Apartheid*.

It was so decided.

6. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): I should like to inform the members of the Council that I have received a letter dated 20 May from the representatives of Togo, Zaire and Zimbabwe [*S/15779*], which reads as follows:

> "We, the undersigned, members of the Security Council, have the honour to request that, during its meetings devoted to consideration of the item entitled 'The situation in Namibia', the Security Council extend an invitation, under rule 39 of its provisional rules of procedure, to Mr. Sam Nujoma, President of the South West Africa People's Organization."

7. If I hear no objection, I shall take it that the Council decides to extend an invitation to Mr. Nujoma in accordance with rule 39 of its provisional rules of procedure.

At the invitation of the President, Mr. Nujoma took a place at the Council table.

8. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): The Council is meeting today in response to requests by the representative of Mauritius, in a letter dated 12 May, and by the representative of India, in a letter dated 13 May addressed to the President of the Council.

9. The members of the Council have before them the following documents: S/15757, which contains the text of a letter dated 9 May from the President of the United Nations Council for Namibia to the Secretary-General, transmitting the text of the Paris Declaration on Namibia and the Report and Programme of Action on Namibia adopted by the International Conference in Support of the Struggle of the Namibian People for Independence, held in Paris from 25 to 29 April 1983;[1] S/15675 and Corr.1 and 2, which contains the text of a letter dated 30 March from the representative of India to the Secretary-General and S/15776, which contains a further report of the Secretary-General concerning the implementation of Security Council resolutions 435 (1978) and 439 (1978) concerning the question of Namibia dated 19 May.

10. The members of the Council have also received photocopies of a letter dated 20 May from the representative of Mauritius to the President of the Council. The text of the letter will be distributed as document S/15781.

11. The first speaker is the Minister for Foreign Affairs of India, Mr. Narasimha Roa, whom I welcome, who wishes to make a statement in his capacity as representative of the Chairman of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries. I invite him to take a place at the Council table and to make his statement.

12. Mr. RAO (India): My delegation has already had occasion earlier this month, to extend to you, Sir, its sincere felicitations on your assumption of the high office of President of the Council for the month of May. Permit me to avail myself of this opportunity to convey to you and, through you, to the other members of the Council the greetings and good wishes of the Prime Minister of India, Mrs. Indira Gandhi, in her capacity as Chairman of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries. Allow me also to convey to you my personal congratulations on your assumption of the presidency of the Council. We are happy to see in the Chair the representative of a fellow non-aligned country with which India has traditionally enjoyed close and cordial relations. It is only appropriate that we should be meeting here today under the stewardship of a distinguished son of Africa to consider the question of Namibia. We are confident that, with your rich diplomatic experience and skill, the Council will be able to address itself in a meaningful and decisive manner to the item on its agenda. I should like to avail myself of this opportunity to assure you of the wholehearted co-operation of my delegation.

13. I have come before the Council along with several of my colleagues from non-aligned countries, on the strength of a mandate from the Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries who met at their Seventh Conference at New Delhi from 7 to 12 March. At that Conference, the Heads of State or Government:

> "called upon the United Nations Security Council to meet, as soon as possible, in order to consider further action on the implementation of its plan for Namibia's independence thereby assuming its primary responsibility for implementation of Security Council resolution 435 (1978)." [*See S/15675 and Corr.1 and 2, para. 49.*]

14. The presence here today of a large number of Ministers for Foreign Affairs from non-aligned countries is a reflection of the fact that the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries has traditionally considered the question of Namibia as an issue of paramount concern and made common cause with the people of Namibia in their struggle for freedom and dignity.

15. The New Delhi Conference devoted considerable attention to this question of critical importance and reaffirmed the fundamental principles highlighted in successive meetings and conferences of the Movement, which are as follows: one, the people of Namibia have the inalienable right to self-determination, freedom and national independence in a united Namibia, including Walvis Bay, the Penguin and other offshore islands; two, Namibia is the direct responsibility of the United Nations; three, the South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO) is the sole and authentic representative of the Namibian people; four, the continued illegal occupation of Namibia by the racist South African régime and its refusal to comply with resolutions of the United Nations, as well as its attempts to devise and impose fraudulent consititutional and political schemes from time to time to perpetuate its hold on that Territory, should be condemned vigorously and unequivocally by the international community; five, South Africa's exploitation of the natural resources of Namibia, directly by itself as well as through foreign interests under the protection of the occupying Administration, is illegal and constitutes a serious violation of the Charter of the United Nations and an obstacle to the political independence of Namibia; six, the activities of SWAPO, in particular the People's Liberation Army of Namibia, including armed struggle, against the illegal Administration and the forces of occupation are fully justified as a legitimate means to achieve freedom and national independence; seven, the countries of the Non-Aligned Movement pledge to render all possible material, financial, military, political, humanitarian, diplomatic and moral assistance to SWAPO in its struggle to secure the total liberation of Namibia; eight, Council resolution 435 (1978) endorsing the United Nations plan for the independence of Namibia constitutes the only basis for the peaceful settlement of the Namibian question, and any linkage or parallelism between the independence of Namibia and the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola must be categorically rejected.

16. I have just given a complete recapitulation of the position of the Non-Aligned Movement on what has become a sad chapter in the annals of the United Nations, which otherwise has reason to be proud of its record in the quest for decolonization. The same principles have indeed been endorsed year after year by the United Nations itself. In spite of this, and in spite of the fact that for almost 17 long years now Namibia has been a direct trust of the United Nations, the Territory continues to remain under the illegitimate occupation of a repressive and racist régime which has continued to treat the will of the international community with utter contempt.

17. All this while the people of Namibia have suffered the tyranny of bondage and deprivation. They have been denied any role in their Government, barred from exercising their basic human rights, forced virtually at gunpoint to join the so-called South West Africa Territory Force to fight their own people and herded into a tiny fraction of their land through the extension within Namibia of the infamous bantustan system. Ruthless and systematic attempts are being made by South Africa to undermine, discredit and destroy SWAPO. The economic resources of Namibia continue to be plundered. South Africa has also used the Territory to launch acts of aggression, intimidation, destabilization and depredation against independent African States in the region, thus creating a serious threat to regional and international peace and security. Pretoria has similarly carried out reprisal attacks against front-line States on one pretext or another; the air raid against Mozambique reported today is the latest. Apart from the enormous human and material losses to the front-line States as a result of these attacks, hundreds of thousands of people have been made refugees in the many countries which were already bearing the burden of refugees fleeing from Namibia.

18. Can the international community afford to allow South Africa to continue to flout all norms of civilized conduct in this fashion? For how much longer must the Namibian people endure untold sufferings? What else must be allowed to happen, and at what price to the Namibian patriots, for the United Nations to bring the full weight of its legal, moral and political authority to bear on the racist, illegal régime of South Africa in order to obtain full independence for Namibia, for which the United Nations has assumed unique responsibility?

19. It is now more than four years since the Council adopted resolution 435 (1978) endorsing the United Nations plan for Namibia independence. These years have seen the hopes of the world community wax and wane, expectations being raised now and again only to be betrayed on every occasion. The Pretoria régime has raised one issue after another, invariably on flimsy grounds, with a view to delaying a settlement. The latest in the series of pretexts has been the attempted linkage or parallelism by which the issue of Namibian independence has been sought to be entangled with an entirely irrelevant and extraneous question. We deeply regret that certain countries have, together with Pretoria, projected this linkage and have thus only abetted South Africa in its persistent designs aimed at further delaying the independence of Namibia. We note with satisfaction that some members of the contact group of five Western countries have dissociated themselves from this linkage. But others have not done so, and it is indeed on the support and assistance of these countries that the racist Government of South Africa relies and without which it could not possibly continue to be so intransigent. The feelings and views of the overwhelming majority of the international community on this and other related aspects of the Namibian question have again been clearly expressed in the Paris Declaration on Namibia adopted by acclamation at the International Conference in Support of the Struggle of the Namibian People for Independence, held from 25 to 29 April in Paris.[1]

20. Two years ago, when the talks organized by the Secretary-General for the implementation of Security Council resolution 435 (1978) had broken down and when doubt was being cast on the very relevance of resolution 435 (1978), the Council was convened in similar extraordinary circumstances, and I had occasion to address the Council [*2269th meeting*]. Although the Council was then unable to take an immediate decision,

the debate on that occasion helped categorically to reaffirm the continuing validity of resolution 435 (1978). The front-line States and SWAPO have laboured long and arduously since then, through intensive consultations undertaken with the contact group, to remove all the doubts and obstacles that had come in the way of implementation of resolution 435 (1978). As we are now informed by the Secretary-General in his report, this phase of the work of the contact group has concluded. According to that report, "the only outstanding issues are the choice of the electoral system and the settlement of some final problems relating to the United Nations Transition Assistance Group and its composition" [*S/15776, para. 18*].

21. SWAPO has given a positive response, but South Africa has been dragging its feet and has delayed giving a reply. This then remains the only impediment, posed by South Africa, to putting into operation the United Nations plan approved in resolution 435 (1978).

22. I should like to avail myself of this opportunity to express a special word of appreciation for the strenuous efforts exerted by the Secretary-General towards making Namibian independence a reality. We are all aware of his deep personal commitment to this question and the intensive consultations he has carried out, particularly over the last year, with all the parties concerned and in various places, with a view to ensuring the implementation of resolution 435 (1978). As the Secretary-General himself has stated in his report, he regards the problem of Namibia as his special responsibility in view of the unique relationship between the United Nations and the people of Namibia. We pay tribute to him for his dedication and his assiduous espousal of the Namibian cause. We deem it appropriate that the Council should strengthen his hands in this endeavour.

23. As I said earlier, considerable time has elapsed since the adoption of resolution 435 (1978). It is high time that the Council devoted its attention to the imperative necessity of implementing that resolution without further delay. By doing so, not only would it be addressing itself to its primary responsibility, but it would also demonstrate the will to implement its own decisions as is incumbent upon it in terms of the Charter. My delegation is convinced that the Council must now stipulate a definite time-frame for the implementation of resolution 435 (1978) and remain actively seized of the question until that process is completed. If South Africa continues to defy the Council's decisions, the Council should be prepared to consider appropriate action under Chapter VII of the Charter.

24. Decisive action on the part of the Council will, in turn, demand a display of the necessary political will and co-operation on the part of all its members, particularly those States, both within the Council and outside it, which might especially be in a position to facilitate the process. We hope that all concerned will finally be able to rise above considerations of narrow self-interest and help in the fulfilment of their common commitment, namely, the independence of Namibia.

25. The Indian people and the Government of India have always held dear the Namibian cause; this is of a piece with India's abiding commitment to the universal principles of human freedom and dignity. We have actively participated in earlier deliberations in the Council as well as in other forums on the Namibian question. On every such occasion we have fervently supported the inalienable right of the Namibian people to independence. We have decried South Africa's continued illegal occupation of the Territory, its unscrupulous plunder of Namibia's resources and the repression of its people, and South Africa's belligerent acts, which threaten the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the front-line States and other independent African countries of the region. India was among the first countries to address the question of Namibia at the United Nations in 1946. Also in 1946, India imposed comprehensive voluntary sanctions against South Africa. We have been happy and proud to extend moral and material assistance to the people of Namibia through SWAPO. In the United Nations Council for Namibia, we have striven to protect and preserve the interests of Namibia and to promote by all means its early accession to independence.

26. The Council has a solemn responsibility towards the people of Namibia. It must now discharge that responsibility resolutely and expeditiously. It must brook no further prevarication or dilatory tactics. It must not permit itself to be paralysed into inaction and sully its prestige as the most powerful organ of the United Nations and as the guardian of international peace and security. The situation in southern Africa and in Namibia is explosive and is becoming a serious threat to regional and world peace. If Namibian independence does not become a reality soon, the consequences could be disastrous.

27. In conclusion, I have the honour to read out the following message from Mrs. Indira Gandhi, Prime Minister of India and Chairman of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries:

> "For 17 years Namibia has been the direct trust of the United Nations. Throughout this period, South Africa has continued to occupy Namibia in brazen defiance of the will of the world community and has inflicted indignities on the Namibian people. Lately these acts of aggression have been increasing.
>
> "The Security Council has a solemn responsibility for the people of Namibia, whose right to independence can no longer be delayed. The Council must make South Africa comply with the United Nations plan, by imposing mandatory sanctions, if necessary. India hopes that this special meeting of the Security Council will support and give hope to the brave freedom fighters of SWAPO."

28. Sir John THOMSON (United Kingdom): I should like to begin by assuring you, Sir, that Mr. Umba di Lutete has set the highest standards of presidency, but I know that all your colleagues will share my pleasure in

sitting again under your Presidency. It is, if I may say so, an encouragement to all of us to see how you have risen from the Council.

29. I should like to say also that it is a privilege and a pleasure for me to find myself a partner of the Minister for Foreign Affairs of India in opening this debate. India is a country for which I have the highest regard and affection. The Movement of Non-Aligned Countries is very fortunate to have India in the position of chairmanship and leadership. I would only say that it is typical of India's position in the world and of the efficiency with which the Indian Government runs things that India in the space of less than a year is host to the Asian Games, to the Seventh Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries and to the meeting of Heads of Government of the Commonwealth. I think this is a tribute to the achievements and leadership of India.

30. My next remarks are more gloomy. This debate is opening against a sombre background. Once again the process of negotiation and of dialogue has been punctuated by horrifying acts of violence. The events of the past four days are a bad augury for our efforts in this debate to promote a peaceful settlement in Namibia. As I made clear in the Council on 15 December last year [*2407th meeting*], my Government has always deplored the use of violence from any quarter in the search for solutions to the problems of southern Africa. Today in London the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, Mr. Francis Pym, issued the following statement:

> "I was shocked to hear of the incidents this morning involving attacks by South African forces on targets in Mozambique. I deeply regret the human suffering these will have caused, and I deplore this violation of Mozambique's sovereignty. I have repeatedly made clear my view that the problems of southern Africa cannot be solved by violence. I condemn these actions, just as I condemn the violence in Pretoria on Friday, when a car bomb caused loss of life and injury. There is a desperate need to break the vicious circle where violence begets violence and to seek peaceful solutions to the region's problems."

31. The horryfying toll in civilian casualties from the Pretoria car bomb and the openly acknowledged violation of Mozambican sovereignty further underline the pressing need for a successful outcome to current negotiations, which we are now discussing. In the nine months I have been here, it has become plain to me that the Namibian question is one of the most urgent and important questions facing the United Nations. It is a problem for which the United Nations has direct responsibility. And it is a problem which, I am convinced, can be solved peacefully and through negotiation. The achievement of such a solution will be good for all of us and for the United Nations.

32. My Government, together with our partners in the contact group, has consistently recognized the urgent need for a negotiated settlement. Through our close friendship with a wide range of African countries, we have constantly been aware of the deep feelings aroused by the unlawful occupation of Namibia and of its effect on the security and stability of the region. There has been no ambivalence in our support for a peaceful solution. It was, indeed, dedication to such a solution which brought together five like-minded members of the Security Council in 1977 and 1978 in a unique exercise in creative diplomacy. This led to the formulation of the settlement proposal and to Council resolution 435 (1978).

33. I welcome the participation in this debate of many Ministers for Foreign Affairs coming from a wide variety of countries—from the front-line States, the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries. Their presence makes it all the more important that we should use this occasion to underline our unanimity on the question of Namibia. On behalf of the United Kingdom, may I also welcome Mr. Nujoma, President of SWAPO, to New York, some 12 years, I believe, since he first took part in a Council debate.

34. The report we have received from the Secretary-General [*S/15776*], written with his customary frankness and lucidity, provides useful background to our deliberations. My Government fully agrees with him on the importance of a settlement; the progress which has been made to lay a sound foundation for one; and the urgent need to strengthen efforts to bring about the early independence of Namibia.

35. I should like not only to thank the Secretary-General for his report but also to express appreciation of the personal concern he has shown for Namibia. Since taking office, he has publicly assigned a very high priority to this subject. As he mentions in his report, he has kept in close and frequent contact with the parties. He has visited the front-line States and he has taken advantage of international gatherings and bilateral meetings to discuss Namibia with a very large number of the world's leaders.

36. Under the Secretary-General's supervision, the Secretariat has worked impressively to develop the preparations for implementation and for the emplacement of the United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG) to their present advanced level. Much credit for this must go to the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Namibia, Mr. Martti Ahtisaari. Members of the contact group have co-operated closely with the Secretariat in this preparatory work. The group has held many discussions with the Secretary-General and his officials over the past year. The United Kingdom, like other members of the group, has told the Secretary-General that it stands ready to make a substantial contribution to the large and costly exercise of implementing the settlement proposal.

37. The Secretary-General and his staff have shown their awareness of the importance of demonstrating that the United Nations can act swiftly, impartially and effectively to implement the settlement plan. This will be vital to secure the confidence of the parties, although, of

course, it is not sufficient in and of itself to achieve implementation.

38. It is two years since the Council last debated the question of Namibia [*2267th to 2277th meetings.*] Members of the Council and of the United Nations as a whole are concerned, as we are, at the slow rate of progress towards implementation. It is natural that the Council should now wish to review the situation. I welcome the opportunity to make a statement on the progress achieved by the group of which the United Kingdom is a member in partnership with the front-line States and with other United Nations Members and the Secretariat.

39. I begin by reiterating the principle to which the contact group adheres of a peaceful, just and internationally acceptable settlement. I trust that all who participate in this debate will equally state their adherence to this principle. Furthermore, I trust that they will agree that every possible effort should be made to avoid bloodshed and escalation of the conflict, that they will bear in mind the Council's particular responsibility for the settlement plan and that they will help to protect the role and standing of the Council.

40. As all members of the Council are aware, the very nature of the Council's work and its ability to take constructive steps to solve the problems brought before it are under separate consideration. We have recently had Council debates on various issues which have failed to produce a positive outcome. Last week, however, the Council adopted unanimously a helpful resolution on Nicaragua [*resolution 530 (1983)*]. It gave the Council's support to the efforts of the Contadora Group, a Latin American form of contact group.

41. This week we have the opportunity, through a constructive debate and resolution, to provide additional impetus to the march towards a Namibian settlement. I hope that the Council, together with those non-members who give us the benefit of their wisdom, will seize this opportunity and give support to the contact group on Namibia.

42. Just as we have the chance to help, so also it lies within the power of the Council to hinder a settlement. This is something we have to bear in mind. I cannot believe that there is anyone here who seeks to undermine a peaceful solution. Anyone who did would do ill to the people of Namibia and of the other countries affected by the dispute that so urgently need the settlement outlined in resolution 435 (1978). But even with the best of intentions, we can all make mistakes. Here is a matter on which we must be practical, not precipitate; prudent rather than prejudicial. We all want the same outcome. We must take care to see that the path we follow will lead to it.

43. In the first part of his report, the Secretary-General has provided the Council with a concise factual summary of developments over the past two years. I should not take up the time of the Council by repeating what he has set out so clearly. However, it may be helpful if I expand on certain aspects of the negotiations in which the contact group has been concerned.

44. The events of the past two years must be seen against the background of the failure of the pre-implementation meeting held at Geneva from 7th to 14th January 1981. Geneva was the low point in the long history of these negotiations. The drive for a peaceful settlement appeared to have reached an impasse. This was particularly disappointing for the United Kingdom, which just over a year earlier had signed the Lancaster House Agreement to end the conflict in what was then Southern Rhodesia. In his concluding statement at Lancaster House the British Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs expressed the hope that the successful outcome to those talks would have a favourable impact on the Namibian negotiations.

45. On 19 January 1981, Lord Carrington described the failure to reach agreement at Geneva as an especially regrettable setback after the great efforts of the United Nations, the Western contact group of five and the front-line States to meet the reasonable concerns of South Africa and the internal parties. He expressed the British Government's support for the closing appeal of the Chairman of the conference to those concerned to reconsider their position. The appeal to the Government of South Africa to review the implications of the meeting and to reconsider its position was subsequently renewed by the previous Secretary-General in the further report he submitted to the Council on 19 January 1981 [*S/14333*].

46. The Geneva meeting showed with crystal clarity, that while the negotiations had not formally broken down, there was an urgent need to explore fresh ways of giving momentum to them. This indeed was reflected by the previous Secretary-General in the concluding remarks of his report. In response to the Secretary-General's appeal, the contact group undertook an urgent reassessment of the situation at meetings of senior officials and Ministers for Foreign Affairs in the spring of 1981. The members of the group decided to continue and to redouble their efforts to bring about a settlement. They reaffirmed their conviction that only a settlement under the aegis of the United Nations would be acceptable to the international community and that resolution 435 (1978) remained a solid basis for the transition to independence of Namibia. In view of the obstacles that had arisen to the implementation of resolution 435 (1978), the contact group decided to develop proposals that would give greater confidence to all parties regarding the future of an independent Namibia.

47. The contact group therefore undertook a further round of international consultations during 1981. As in the past, it sought to work in partnership with the front-line States and to keep the Secretariat informed of its activities. Senior representatives of the contact group held a series of meetings in Africa with their counterparts from the front-line States and SWAPO. Parallel consul-

tations were conducted with the South African Government. In these consultations the contact group directly addressed the problems which had resulted in the impasse at Geneva. It was able to secure broad agreement on a constitutional framework which would provide confidence in Namibia's political future.

48. Having achieved this broad agreement, the contact group gave the first priority to refining a set of constitutional principles which would be acceptable to all. By the spring of 1982, work on these principles was almost complete. Against the background of solid and encouraging progress, the Foreign Ministers of the countries members of the contact group met in Luxembourg on 17 May 1982. They decided that negotiations on all matters should be accelerated in order to take advantage of the more favourable climate for a settlement which had emerged. They set in hand a further contact group mission, which visited certain African countries in June 1982. As a result of this mission and of a subsequent meeting of the front-line States, it was agreed that informal consultations should be held in New York.

49. Thus, through the diplomatic partnership of the two informal groups of interlocutors, by the middle of 1982 we had succeeded in recovering the ground lost at Geneva. In July and August of 1982 the informal consultations took place here in New York. Final agreement was reached on the text of principles concerning the Constituent Assembly and the Constitution for an independent Namibia. As the Secretary-General has reported, these were transmitted to him on 12 July 1982 [*S/15287*].

50. Substantial progress was made in the consultations on other outstanding issues. These, too, are covered in the Secretary-General's report and I need not therefore repeat the details. Throughout this period, parallel consultations were being conducted with the South African Government. The contact group also engaged in detailed planning with officials of the Secretariat. By 24 September 1982, at the outset of the thirty-seventh session of the General Assembly, representatives of the contact group and of the front-line States and SWAPO were in a position jointly to report to the Secretary-General on the progress they had made.

51. At this stage I should perhaps summarize the situation which has been reached as a result of the activity I have described. The cornerstone of our approach is, as ever, the contact group's proposal of 10 April 1978 for a settlement [*S/12636*], which was drafted in accordance with resolution 385 (1976) and was adopted by the Council in resolution 435 (1978). Resolution 435 (1978) has been accepted by all parties and stands as the basis for an internationally recognized settlement.

52. The principles concerning the Constituent Assembly and the Constitution for an independent Namibia have, as I have already noted, been agreed and published. These lay down unambiguously the eligibility of every Namibian to participate in elections without discrimination or fear of intimidation, to vote in secret and to be guaranteed full freedom of speech, assembly, movement and the press. All political parties are to have a full and fair opportunity to organize and to participate in the electoral process, and the electoral system will seek to ensure fair representation in the Constituent Assembly of different political parties which gain substantial support in the election. Namibia is to be a unitary, sovereign and democratic State, whose Constitution will be the supreme law and may be amended only by a designated process. The executive and legislative branches of the Government are to be constituted by periodic and genuine elections held by secret vote. There is to be a declaration of fundamental rights, which will be consistent with the provisions of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Criminal offences cannot be created with retrospective effect. Provision is to be made for the balanced structuring of the public service, the police service and the defence services and for equal access by all to recruitment for these services. Provision is also to be made for the establishment of elected councils for local or regional administration.

53. In accepting these principles, the parties have committed themselves to a future for Namibia in which all the people of the Territory may have confidence. Likewise, the "question of impartiality", which was the major stumbling-block at Geneva, has in essence been resolved. This is described in paragraph 12 of the Secretary-General's report.

54. Substantial progress has also been made on the composition and deployment of the military component of UNTAG. Other essential preparations for the emplacement of UNTAG in Namibia have been taken to an advanced level by the Secretariat. These, too, are recorded in the Secretary-General's report, in paragraph 10.

55. In paragraph 18 of his report, the Secretary-General states that as far as the United Nations is concerned the only outstanding issues are the choice of the electoral system and the settlement of some final problems relating to UNTAG and its composition. He also says that, in his talks with the representatives of South Africa, he has stressed the urgency of proceeding with the implementation of resolution 435 (1978). I record my Government's agreement on both points. These are indeed the only outstanding problems under resolution 435 (1978). The United Kingdom would like to see a climate created in which implementation can take place as soon as possible and with the certainty of success.

56. We appreciate the constructive and flexible attitude of the parties, in particular that of our African partners, which has made possible substantial progress towards the implementation of resolution 435 (1978). We reiterate our commitment to that goal and to the achievement of a settlement which would strengthen peace and security and foster economic development in the region. We share the concern that factors relating to the regional situation in southern Africa—which are, however, outside the scope of the contact group's mandate—have not

yet permitted implementation of the United Nations plan.

57. We must find a way to make the final leap forward. The people of Namibia have waited too long for their freedom and independence. We are very conscious too of the hardship which the people of Angola have undergone since 1976 and are still facing. We have much sympathy for them in their protracted suffering. It is time the people of Angola were able to live their lives in peace, free from foreign occupation, from external interference and from acts of violence from any quarter. The problems of the region cannot be solved by violence. There must be a solution in Namibia which assures the security of all States in the region, and the security requirements of Angola and of the Angolan Government must be fully met in any settlement.

58. In this context, we are deeply concerned at the continuing presence on Angolan territory of elements of the armed forces of South Africa. We know that the parties are in direct contact about these problems, and we very much hope that these talks will lead to a successful outcome. The United Nations plan for Namibia cannot, of course, be implemented without the withdrawal of these South Africa forces. A Namibia settlement requires their withdrawal.

59. This is, of course, a sovereign matter for the Angolan Government, and we must all respect its decisions. This being so, we are reluctant to cut across the actions of the Angolan Government. We do not wish to tell it how to conduct its own affairs—and this I am sure is also the view of our friends in the front-line States; yet at the same time we hope that a satisfactory conclusion to these talks will be reached quickly. Then we can focus on the business of the implementation of resolution 435 (1978).

60. We have struck a road-block, but we are determined to remove it. We are maintaining our efforts with all urgency and believe that, with the continuing support of the international community, they can be brought to fruition. Our concern is to try to solve the practical problem, and together with our partners we are continuing to work to this end.

61. While the independence of Namibia is our main goal, we must not forget its economic development. This is an important objective which the contact group has borne in mind. We are very concerned about the effects of the extended conflict and also about the drought which has afflicted Namibia for so many years. At the time of independence Namibia will face a difficult economic transition. As in the case of Zimbabwe, we hope to assist the new nation in its efforts to overcome these problems. We have long experience and useful technical skills, developed through economic co-operation with many other countries, which, we believe could help to promote Namibia's longer-term economic and social development. We would naturally be happy to work with other Governments and international organizations in such programmes.

62. In paragraph 20 of his report, the Secretary-General concludes that much progress has been made in laying a sound foundation for the just and peaceful settlement of the Namibia problem and calls urgently on all concerned to strengthen and concert their efforts within the framework of the United Nations. He urges us all to demonstrate the necessary political will to bring about the early independence of Namibia in accordance with the United Nations plan. As the first member of the contact group to speak, I am happy to accept the Secretary-General's call. I am sure that the other members of the group who follow me will do likewise.

63. The joint efforts of the front-line States and the contact group have brought us tantalizingly close to success. I should like to play a tribute to the tenacity, patience and skill that members of both groups have shown in the pursuit of a peaceful settlement. I cannot believe that anyone who is genuinely concerned for the people of southern Africa would argue that the progress we have made should be abandoned. There is, as I have said, a practical difficulty which is not of our making but, as I have demonstrated, progress has been made. At Geneva, we were near the bottom of the valley. We have come up a long way since, even if we have not yet quite reached the peak. There are grounds for encouragement in the solid achievements since the last debate of the Council on this item. We have successfully negotiated boulders, gulleys and glaciers. If we maintain this course we shall succeed. We have self-interest as well as justice on our side. Continued occupation of Namibia—in defiance of the international community and at great cost in political, human and economic terms—cannot serve the best interests of South Africa.

64. There are soft options we could have taken. After Geneva we could all too easily have abandoned the search for a peaceful settlement and thus evaded the brickbats which are from time to time hurled at the searchers. There are moments when membership of the contact group feels like the walnut tree in Aesop's fables. People passing the tree would fling sticks and stones at its branches in order to bring down the fruit, and the tree suffered severely. "It is hard," cried the tree, "that the very persons who enjoy my fruit should thus reward me with insults and blows." May I remind our friends that, while the walnut is usually the last tree in the forest to burst into leaf, that is because its strength is going into the making of fruit.

65. Our task as negotiators has not been easy. We do not accept South Africa's occupation of Namibia as lawful. We have said so again and again, just as we have denounced the system of *apartheid*. But South Africa is in possession, and not surprisingly has various apprehensions. We know the settlement terms are equitable and just and will be administered impartially. It is important to convince not only the South Africans of this but also all sections of opinion within Namibia. We are demonstrating scrupulous fairness in negotiating with them a peaceful solution.

66. The situation in Namibia, it is true, is radically different from that of pre-independence Rhodesia. The one is not a blueprint for the other. Yet there are two lessons that we learned from Rhodesia which I believe are applicable to Namibia. The first is that it was possible, by being both determined and fair, to persuade through negotiation those who exercised power unlawfully in Southern Rhodesia to submit voluntarily to an election under universal suffrage. It has thus been demonstrated that this is an attainable objective, not an impracticable notion. Secondly, the Lancaster House settlement could not have been implemented without the co-operation and assistance of South Africa. Let us not only criticize where criticism is merited but also give credit where credit is due. South Africa should not have helped to sustain the administration of Ian Smith in Southern Rhodesia, but had the South African Government not accepted the Lancaster House settlement, had it done no more than withdraw infrastructural support during the period of implementation and transition, it would have been exceedingly difficult, if not impossible, to put the settlement into effect. It is to the credit of the South African Government that it helped to implement that settlement. To implement the Namibian settlement, the United Nations will similarly require the co-operation and physical assistance of the South African Government.

67. The alternative to the course we have pursued would be to leave the war to intensify rather than to strive for peace. This would indeed be the counsel of despair, and we must ask ourselves whose interests it would serve—certainly not those of the people of Namibia. The Council cannot and must not sacrifice the Namibians and abandon them to the disruption and fear and instability that have characterized their lives for too many years. It would be wholly irresponsible of us to set aside the search for a settlement.

68. The problem of South West Africa was first raised at the United Nations in 1946. It has been before the United Nations almost throughout the United Nations existence. It takes its place in a range of intractable, dangerous and long-standing issues before the United Nations. Grappling with them is one of the primary purposes of the Organization. We at the United Nations are in a position to see Namibia in the perspective of other problems relating to the unlawful occupation of territory and to the deprivation of the right to self-determination, some dating back for many years, others having arisen more recently. Most of those problems affect the security and stability of the surrounding regions. Most entail casualties, in some cases on a tragic scale, and disruption of the lives of the inhabitants.

69. In the case of Namibia, however, there are some significant differences. The basis for a negotiated settlement exists and is widely accepted. The right to self-determination is recognized by all. The responsibility of the United Nations is clearly established. We have a viable plan for implementation of that responsibility. And we have two complementary groups of United Nations Members committed to work for implementation. We have each of us an opportunity in this debate to assist by making constructive contributions and by formulating a draft resolution which will reinforce, not undermine, the negotiating process.

70. The Government of the United Kingdom therefore hopes that the message will go out from this Council meeting that there is urgent, legitimate and well-founded pressure from all sides for implementation of the United Nations plan. We trust that the Council will stress that an immediate peaceful settlement is unquestionably in the best interests of all the people of Namibia and of the countries bordering Namibia, including South Africa.

71. The international community is right to say that there is an urgent need to reach a conclusion. That is what we say too. The difference is that we have taken on the practical responsibility for bringing it about. If we should ever conclude that we cannot manage it, we shall give the task up to others. Meanwhile, we intend to persevere. And we intend to succeed.

72. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): I call next on the President of the United Nations Council for Namibia, Mr. Paul Lusaka.

73. Mr. LUSAKA: Mr. President, on behalf of the United Nations Council for Namibia I should like, through you, to thank the Security Council for acceding to our request to participate in this important debate on Namibia. I should like, at the start of an important debate on an important African and world issue, to congratulate you, Sir, on your presidency of the Council during this month of May. We have been highly impressed by the manner in which your delegation has so far conducted the business of the Council. With your wealth of experience and skill we are confident that you will guide the deliberations on Namibia to a successful conclusion.

74. The United Nations Council for Namibia, as we all know, is the legal Administering Authority for Namibia until independence. As such, the lack of progress towards implementation of United Nations resolutions on Namibia, especially Security Council resolutions 385 (1976) and 435 (1978), causes us great concern. We have come to the Council with the hope that together we can find ways of expediting the implementation of the United Nations plan for the independence of Namibia.

75. This body unanimously adopted resolution 385 (1976) on 30 January 1976. In paragraph 7 of that resolution, the Council declared that:

> "in order that the people of Namibia may be enabled freely to determine their own future, it is imperative that free elections under the supervision and control of the United Nations be held for the whole of Namibia as one political entity."

76. On 29 September 1978, the Council adopted resolution 435 (1978), by which it approved the report of the

Secretary-General [*S/12827*] on the implementation of the proposals for a settlement of the Namibian situation [*S/12636*] and also established, under the authority of the Security Council, a United Nations Transition Assistance Group in order to assist the Secretary-General to "ensure the early independence of Namibia through free elections under the supervision and control of the United Nations".

77. Nearly five years after the adoption of resolution 435 (1978), the United Nations plan has still not been implemented. South Africa has even become more entrenched in Namibia today than it was in 1978. It has introduced more troops into Namibia to consolidate its illegal occupation of the Territory and also to carry out its acts of aggression against both the people of Namibia and the independent African States in the region.

78. We are told that talks have been held during those five years with South Africa in order to implement the United Nations plan. At every stage of those talks, South Africa and its allies have introduced new elements aimed at delaying the implementation of the United Nations plan. At the present moment, we are told that the implementation of that plan must be linked to the withdrawal of Cuban forces from Angola. This is an issue without any relevance to the question of the implementation of the plan and the independence of Namibia.

79. The time has come for the Security Council to reflect on what has happened during the past five years since the adoption of its resolution 435 (1978) and why it has happened, so that corrective measures can be taken. During the five years, talks on the implementation of the United Nations plan have been undertaken outside the United Nations framework. They have been undertaken by a group of States, sometimes known as the Western contact group, which are close allies of South Africa. Since the talks have been undertaken outside the United Nations framework, issues that are extraneous to the implementation of the plan have been introduced. Furthermore, some members of the contact group seem to have decided to use the talks on the independence of Namibia as a vehicle for the attainment of their global interests, linking the independence of Namibia to some outdated cold-war rhetoric. Thus the people of Namibia have been held hostage to the global self-interests of some States.

80. We in the United Nations Council for Namibia believe that the moment is here and now to bring all talks concerning the independence of Namibia back fully to the United Nations. The Security Council, as well as the General Assembly, has, in resolution after resolution, reaffirmed the legal and primary responsibility of the United Nations over Namibia. In the Paris Declaration on Namibia, the recently concluded International Conference in Support of the Struggle of the Namibian People for Independence, held in Paris from 25 to 29 April 1983, emphasized that:

> "in accordance with General Assembly resolutions 2145 (XXI) of 27 October 1966 and 2248 (S-V) of 19 May 1967, Namibia is the direct responsibility of the United Nations Council for Namibia, the legal Administering Authority for the Territory until its independence, and expresses its strong support for the efforts of the United Nations Council for Namibia in the fulfilment of the mandate entrusted to it."[2]

81. The United Nations Council for Namibia is committed to the early attainment of the independence of Namibia, and unequivocally believes that resolution 435 (1978) remains the only basis for a peaceful settlement of the Namibian question. Furthermore, the United Nations Council for Namibia firmly rejects the continued attempts by a member of the contact group, namely, the United States, and the South African régime to obstruct the implementation of resolution 435 (1978) and to establish any linkage or parallelism between the independence of Namibia and extraneous and irrelevant issues, in particular the withdrawal of Cuban forces from Angola. It is the view of the United Nations Council for Namibia that the persistence of the attempts at establishing this linkage not only retards the decolonization process in Namibia but also constitutes unwarranted and gross interference in the internal affairs of the People's Republic of Angola.

82. SWAPO, the sole and authentic representative of the people of Namibia, together with the front-line States and Nigeria, have made all the concessions that are necessary and appropriate to enable the United Nations to proceed with the implementation of its plan on Namibia. In August 1982, they were under the impression that progress had been made in the consultations that had taken place in New York between them on the one hand and the contact group on the other. At that time it seemed that the only issue holding up the implementation of the United Nations plan was the electoral issue, namely, what system was to be used in the Namibian elections, which remained unresolved owing to the delaying tactics of South Africa.

83. To complicate matters further, a new element had been introduced in the consultations as far back as June 1981. The United States, a member of the contact group, and South Africa began openly and officially to link the negotiations for the independence of Namibia with the withdrawal of Cuban forces from Angola. By then it had become clear that, whenever SWAPO and the front-line States made concessions in those consultations, new issues, especially extraneous elements, would be introduced to impede the implementation of the United Nations plan.

84. This tactic has led the process of consultations on the implementation of the United Nations plan to come to a complete halt, thus creating a very dangerous impasse. Hence, the situation in Namibia in particular and in southern Africa in general has become very critical and requires an urgent solution before it gets out of hand. This assessment of the dangers inherent in the present impasse was clearly articulated by the Secretary-General when earlier this year he visited a number of African States, including the front-line States.

85. By its resolution 439 (1978), the Security Council demanded that South Africa co-operate with the Council

and the Secretary-General in the implementation of resolutions 385 (1976) and 435 (1978). It warned South Africa that its failure to do so would compel the Council to meet forthwith to initiate appropriate action under the Charter of the United Nations, including Chapter VII thereof, so as to ensure South Africa's compliance with the relevant Council resolutions. Who among us, I ask, can deny that South Africa has refused to co-operate with the Council in the implementation of the United Nations plan on Namibia? Who among us, I further ask, can deny that the constant military attacks on Angola by South Africa are unprovoked acts of aggression against a Member State of the United Nations?

86. The time has therefore come for the Council to consider appropriate action under the Charter of the United Nations to ensure South Africa's co-operation with the United Nations. Those States which have prevented the Council from taking effective measures to bring this about must admit that they themselves have failed to induce South Africa to co-operate with the United Nations on Namibia. Are we, therefore, asking too much of them when we appeal to them to join with all of us and let the Security Council reassert its authority on the question of Namibia?

87. The people of Namibia have suffered enough. They have been brutally treated, tortured and massacred by a régime without conscience, a régime that prides itself on operating outside international norms of behaviour.

88. The road to this meeting of the Security Council has taken us from the Seventh Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, held at New Delhi in March 1983, and the International Conference in Support of the Struggle of the Namibian People for Independence, held in Paris in April 1983. Those two historic conferences have confirmed us in our belief that we must present ourselves before the Security Council.

89. We are now before the Council in connection with specific goals, which together we hope to achieve. We are before the Council to bring the talks on Namibia back within the United Nations framework. That is the only framework that has been established by resolution 435 (1978). It is the only framework within which we can call on the Secretary-General to use his good offices and pursue his mission of peace energetically in the interest of Namibia and the rest of southern Africa. It is the only framework within which there is no recognition of linkage and no consideration of other extraneous factors. It is the only framework within which the situation in Namibia would be under constant review by the Council, to which the Secretary-General would be requested to report as soon as possible on the implementation of resolution 435 (1978).

90. On behalf of the United Nations Council for Namibia, I should like to express our gratitude to the Secretary-General for his recent report on the question of Namibia [*S/15776*]. Our gratitude stems from our appreciation of the lucidity and clarity of purpose shown in this document. The Secretary-General has emphasized in paragraph 14 of his report that the settlement of the Namibian question must be based on Security Council resolution 435 (1978) and has pointed out "the necessity to proceed expeditiously towards the implementation of that resolution." In paragraph 8, he has further made it clear that, with regard to the issue that seemed to hold up the final agreement on the United Nations plan, namely, the electoral system, he has been assured that:

> "all the parties were agreed that this issue must be settled in accordance with the terms of Security Council resolution 435 (1978) and that the issue must not cause delay in the implementation of that resolution".

91. The Secretary-General has very clearly stated in paragraph 11, that the question of the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola is definitely outside the scope of resolution 435 (1978) and "had not been raised or envisaged in previous negotiations on that question".

92. Furthermore, in paragraph 13, he has referred to the reported planned establishment of a council for constitutional development within Namibia in the following terms: "I have emphasized to the Government of South Africa the need to respect the relevant provisions of resolutions 435 (1978) and 439 (1978) regarding internal elections, which are not recognized by the United Nations."

93. We are here before the Council to declare that the United States policy of linkage is a policy that has to do with national interest and East-West confrontation. We are not here for confrontation. The question of Namibia should not be seen through an East-West prism.

94. Angola is an independent State, and we are fully confident that Namibia will also emerge as an independent State. Let us from this point on de-link linkage. From the statement made this afternoon, it appears to us that the United Kingdom has just de-linked itself from linkage. Let us regard linkage as it should be regarded: a price that is placed by South Africa and some of its western allies on Namibia's independence.

95. Namibia is the primary responsibility of the United Nations, and the Security Council is duty-bound to assume its full responsibility for the speedy implementation of its own resolution—resolution 435 (1978). Let the Council decide by what means it wishes to pursue its objective of the speedy implementation of resolution 435 (1978). Within the same framework, the Secretary-General should, in our view, be in a position to pursue the same objective by whatever means of consultations and contacts he may see fit. Our central objective is the reassertion of the United Nations central role in the Namibian question.

96. We believe that, as long as South Africa's illegal occupation of Namibia continues, the destablization policy programme of South Africa directed against all independent African States in southern Africa will continue. The rampaging illegal occupation régime in the Territory of Namibia will persistently see fit, for its own purposes, to commit acts of aggression against all other neighbour-

ing countries. This, in our view, is the crux of the peace and security issue in southern Africa. This illegal occupation of Namibia by the Pretoria régime must be condemned and ended soon. Pretoria's intransigence must be made to stop. In this regard, we wonder why, in August 1982, we were made to understand that the only issue standing in the way of the implementation of the United Nations plan was the electoral system to be used in the Namibian elections. Is this still the only pending issue, I ask, or are there other issues that are holding up the progress of Namibia towards its rightful independence? Let those who have the answers come forward in this debate to state their case without equivocation and without caveats.

97. The OAU, the Non-Aligned Movement and all peace-loving countries have joined SWAPO in declaring their readiness to proceed at once with the implementation of the United Nations plan for Namibia. Let us see whether South Africa and its friends can match this readiness. Namibia's march towards independence cannot be further delayed. The Security Council is duty-bound to ensure that such delays are prevented. Only by rededicating itself to the effective implementation of its resolution 435 (1978) can the Council live up to its responsibilities under the Charter as far as the maintenance of peace and security in southern Africa is concerned. Only through the early attainment of independence by Namibia can this goal be achieved.

98. The United Nations Council for Namibia is in full agreement with the assessment made by the Secretary-General in his report to which reference has already been made. The Secretary-General reached several apt conclusions with which we in the United Nations Council for Namibia fully concur. Here I should like to quote from paragraph 16 of that report, where the Secretary-General says: "It is evident that the delay in implementing resolution 435 (1978) is having a destructive impact not only on Namibia itself but also on the prospect of a peaceful and prosperous future for the region as a whole."

99. In view of this, there is no doubt in our minds that the time for action is now.

100. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): The next speaker is Mr. Sam Nujoma, President of the South West Africa People's Organization.

101. Mr. NUJOMA: First of all, Mr. President, I should like to take this opportunity to thank you and, through you, the other members of the Council for allowing me to participate in these deliberations.

102. I take this opportunity also to congratulate you, Sir, upon your assumption of the presidency of the Council for the month of May. I am indeed pleased to see a distinguished son of Africa, a seasoned diplomat, a man of many high qualities and the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Zaire presiding over these deliberations at this crucial stage in the struggle of the Namibian people for liberation and genuine independence. We feel sure that, under your able leadership, the Council will be able to discharge its important duties successfully.

103. The SWAPO delegation is greatly inspired by the presence of so many Ministers for Foreign Affairs and other high officials who have kindly agreed to come to the United Nations in order to participate in this debate. We are grateful to the member States of both the OAU and the Non-Aligned Movement for having designated several Ministers for Foreign Affairs to present a collective demand before this body for the speedy independence of Namibia, in accordance with the resolutions and decisions of the United Nations and particularly on the basis of Security Council resolutions 385 (1976), 435 (1978) and 439 (1978). It is indeed heartening to note that, in addition to those Ministers, there are also other Ministers for Foreign Affairs and high officials from Africa, Asia, Latin America and Europe present for the same purpose.

104. To us, the very fact of such high-level participation and the seriousness with which all the preparations leading to this important series of meetings have been conducted at all stages have underscored the existence of a clear global consensus on the imperative need for the independence of Namibia as a matter of urgency and without any pre-conditions or prevarication. Equally, the demand has been that the Council should assume its primary responsibility in the implementation of its resolution 435 (1978), unfettered by extraneous impediments.

105. Eleven and a half years ago [*1588th meeting*], the Council accorded me a rare privilege as the first freedom fighter to address this body. Today I can hardly suppress the impulse to recall that historic occasion—but with mixed feelings. On the other hand, I recall—indeed with a renewed sense of satisfaction—the congenial and serious atmosphere which prevailed during the meeting of 5 October 1971. Naturally, my colleagues and I in the SWAPO delegation were genuinely moved and greatly encouraged by the repeated expressions of support for and solidarity with our struggle by nearly all the speakers throughout the debate, and we left New York reinforced in our conviction that a clear global consensus had already been reached on the imperative need for the speedy decolonization of Namibia. We also felt reassured in the knowledge that, for its part, the international community would redouble its efforts towards taking the effective and practical measures against racist South Africa provided for in the Charter and the relevant resolutions and decisions of the United Nations on Namibia, thus ending once and for all racist domination, colonial oppression and foreign exploitation in Namibia. That was the positive side of the situation, which offered a basis for optimism.

106. On the other hand, I must register here with deep regret and indignation the fact that our beloved country, Namibia, remains still occupied by a massive South African colonial army of about 100,000 troops, which, in active collaboration with certain major capitalist Powers, has turned Namibia into a garrison State, subjecting the

Namibian masses daily to untold sufferings in the form of cold-blooded murder and abductions—with victims being held incommunicado for indefinite periods—constant torture, incarceration in concentration camps and other fascistic detention centres, massacres of innocent villagers, forcible removal of communities for political or military purposes, destruction of property, including livestock, rapes and various other notorious acts of intimidation and manipulation. This massive military build-up and reign of terror have led to a critical situation whereby today there is one racist soldier for every 12 Namibians.

107. In the characteristic fashion of a fascist régime, the occupation régime has been responsible for the continuous disappearance of Namibian patriots. For example, Johannes Kakuva, Johannes Nakawa and Matias Ashipembe, to cite but a few, have disappeared without trace since 1979 in Kaokoveld and Ovamboland. Another repugnant case is that of the massacre of the Ampolo family at Oshikuku, which involved the deliberate murder of the entire family, consisting of 10 members, in March 1982. Yet another case which vividly shows the kind of atrocities committed daily against our people is that of Kasire Thomas. As frequently happens with many Namibians who are held in racist prisons, he was handed over to a white farmer to be used as a cheap labourer. While at the farm he was subjected to constant intimidation, accused of being a so-called terrorist and murdered in a brutal manner in March 1983. Furthermore, in 1983, Asser Likuwa was cold-bloodedly murdered while working on his land by a South African military convoy for being a member of SWAPO.

108. These atrocities are being carried out under the cover of the existing state of emergency, martial law and other illegal Draconian laws being enacted by the so-called Administrator-General, who has given the army and police a free hand to shoot to kill.

109. It is unnecessary to say that while these brutalities, generalized State terrorism and repression continue unabated against our people, perpetrated by the *apartheid* junta, Namibia's natural resources are being plundered in the most criminal way by the ruthless transnational corporations of the principal Powers members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), whose selfish interest in profits and other strategic concerns are placed above the just rights and legitimate interests of the Namibian people.

110. The situation is the more outrageous and objectionable in that all this is being done in flagrant violation of international law, of the Charter of the United Nations and of Decree No. 1 for the Protection of the Natural Resources of Namibia,[3] enacted by the United Nations Council for Namibia on 27 September 1974 and, last but not least, it is being done to the detriment of the Namibians themselves.

111. This then is the negative side of the Namibian question—and what it demands, as a matter of utmost urgency, is positive action now, not mere exhortations or empty promises about elusive progress which has no basis in truth.

112. The series of meetings held by the Council in 1971 coincided with the fifth anniversary of the termination of racist South Africa's Mandate over Namibia and the assumption by the United Nations of direct legal authority over our country [*General Assembly resolution 2145 (XXI) of 27 October 1966*]. Moreover, I wish to assure the Council that I have no desire to give a historical account of that decision of the General Assembly in 1966 nor, for that matter, of its legal implications. Suffice it to observe that, true to type, certain Western permanent members of the Council somehow managed to find alleged problems with the termination of the Mandate and sought to scuttle all efforts to give full and practical effect to General Assembly resolution 2145 (XXI).

113. It will be recalled that it was precisely for the purpose of clarifying this situation that the Council decided, in its resolution 284 (1970), to submit a question to the International Court of Justice, with the request for an advisory opinion, namely:

> "What are the legal consequences for States of the continued presence of South Africa in Namibia, notwithstanding Security Council resolution 276 (1970)?"[4]

114. I should like to recall briefly what I said when my turn came to make a contribution to the debate in 1971. I said:

> "This session of the Council has been convened to discuss ways and means of enforcing previous decisions of the General Assembly, as well as those of the Security Council, in the light of the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice rendered on 21 June 1971. The International Court gave an unequivocal ruling when it stated in paragraph 133 of the opinion:
>
> > 'the continued presence of South Africa in Namibia being illegal, South Africa is under obligation to withdraw its administration from Namibia immediately and thus put an end to its occupation of the Territory'.
>
> "Discussing this opinion, *The New York Times* stated:
>
> > 'With this historic 13 to 2 verdict, the Court has cleared away the legal and political fog that for years obscured the status of the former German colony.'" [*1588th meeting, paras. 90 and 91.*]

I stated further:

> "The United Nations is confronting the most determined and most serious onslaught on its principles since the Organization was set up. Therefore the Security Council, as an organ which has been assigned the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, should and must not fail to take authoritative and decisive action." [*Ibid., para. 92*].

My statement continued:

> "Who can doubt that a case has arisen for the Security Council to take action as provided for in Articles 40 and 41? The only people who doubt this are the major Western Powers. They do so, not because the situation in Namibia does not threaten international peace and security, but because they want their agents in South Africa to continue providing them with cheap labour, which results in enormous profits for their investors. How long will these people who profess to be the champions of equality, democracy and free speech pursue their insatiable greed for material things and ignore the value of human life? How can the situation in Namibia be described as peaceful when South Africa is arming itself to the teeth with the most advanced weapons of destruction? How does one explain the fact that the South African army is today fighting in Angola, Mozambique, Namibia and Zimbabwe? How does one explain the constant threats made against independent African States? . . . Lastly, what is to become of international law if the countries represented here can ignore with impunity any interpretation of law that is not in their favour?" [*Ibid., para. 94.*]

That is what I had to say.

115. I thought I should make these pertinent observations in order to underscore two points. First, it follows from some of what I have just quoted that the situation in and around Namibia today remains the same as the one I described before the Council in 1971, except that, I must painfully state, the human suffering and destruction of valuable property have increased to alarming proportions, owing to *apartheid* South Africa's continued colonial oppression, racist domination and regional aggression, as well as other acts of destabilization throughout the region.

116. Secondly, I wanted to refute, denounce and reject certain notorious notions that are being propagated by the aggressive and militarist circles of imperialism in favour of racist South Africa. It is being argued that the racist usurpers have what are referred to as legitimate security concerns in the region. In the process, some irrelevant and outrageous arguments have been advanced which purport to exonerate the racist Pretoria junta from its repeated criminality and its banditry against the African masses, who are demanding the restoration of their right to freedom and national emancipation. Likewise, racist South Africa's case, which is completely indefensible, is being presented, as regards Namibia, in a manner that makes the victims appear to be aggressors or villains and the real aggressors and foreign intruders and illegal occupiers of our country to be victims of an alleged total onslaught.

117. The international community has become accustomed to racist South Africa's arrogant and defiant behaviour. Its record of stubborn refusal to implement United Nations resolutions and decisions and to withdraw its illegal colonial administration from Namibia remains a source of deep concern warranting immediate and concerted retribution. The *apartheid* system and its destructive regional manifestations have incurred world-wide condemnation and this anachronistic and repressive system has been declared a crime against humanity. Indeed, international conventions and declarations have been adopted for the suppression and punishment of the crime of *apartheid*. Similarly, *apartheid* South Africa's record of international terrorism has been brought up in numerous publications and is being used as a basis for a world-wide campaign to mobilize positive and concrete action against that neo-Nazi, pariah State in order to compel it to accept the political demands of the African people inside the country, to end illegality and colonial occupation in Namibia and to desist from its aggression against independent African States.

118. Throughout Africa people know that racist South Africa is their public enemy No. 1: it has arrogated to itself the right to attack militarily any African State and occupy its territory. The régime continues the intensification of the *apartheid* reign of terror, perpetrates constant acts of aggression and destabilization against independent African States, under one pretext or another, and is carrying on its vicious programme of massive military build-up in occupied Namibia, while, in keeping with its much-discredited double-barrelled approach, pursuing a public show of so-called new constitutional dispensation, just as it continues to pay lip-service to consultations regarding Namibia's independence. Could one do otherwise than declare the situation in our region to be one constituting a serious threat to international peace and security?

119. What also exposes the peculiar mentality of the white supremacists of the Nationalist Party is the fact that they have in a sinister fashion perfected the Afrikaner politics of self-pity—the so-called laager mentality. That means that they consider themselves, as always, the object of hatred and of an alleged total onslaught—all of which are mere figments of their rotten imagination. Naturally, there is total and world-wide opposition to *apartheid;* there is a strong outcry for democracy in South Africa based on the principle of one man, one vote; and there is also an uncompromising demand for early independence for Namibia as much as for peace and co-operation in the region.

120. However, the struggle is not inspired by racial considerations or by a desire to rob certain sections of the population of their property or to deny individuals their fair share in society. Therefore, these allegations are outrageous and unfounded.

121. During the past two years—which have been years of trials and tribulations for us—we have learned with dismay that the United States is advocating the greater acceptance of South Africa within the global framework of Western security. These are the same people who have publicly embraced that racist State as a friendly ally. The net result of this policy is that Namibia's independence

has been further delayed and the suffering of our people prolonged as they are being held to ransom for the sake of the global ambitions of the United States. How selfish and how hypocritical that is!

122. Allow me at this juncture to make a few observations about the internal situation in Namibia, in order to show that the illegal occupiers there have no intention whatsoever of permitting Namibia's accession to independence for a very long time to come.

123. Despite the fact that South Africa has been forced to concede the idea of Namibia's independence, the *apartheid* rulers have not abandoned their traditional ambition to keep Namibia as either a direct colony or a neo-colony of the white settler State in South Africa; and, with Pretoria's failure in recent years to create a credible political force which would be favourably disposed to serving South Africa's neo-colonial interest and ambition in Namibia, the *apartheid* régime has been left with no other choice but to rely on its military machine in order to continue its illegal occupation of our country. In this connection, Namibia has been turned into a vast besieged garrison. The *apartheid* régime has deployed more than 100,000 troops throughout the country. It has established 75 major military bases and numerous camps, which are deployed throughout the length and breadth of the northern areas of our land. These bases are continually being expanded as well as extensively fortified and equipped with a vast array of arms and ammunition, an ever-increasing number of tanks and armoured personnel carriers and other military vehicles and war-planes. Moreover, there is a general arming of all whites in Namibia; and every white male in Namibia between the ages of 16 and 30 is required by law to perform two years of national service in the South African army of occupation. This is followed by 240 days' service in the so-called Citizen Force, or Commandos. In addition, many of them are called upon for operational duty for indefinite periods. Recently the South African military establishment in Namibia also began to call upon white women for service in the Commando and Citizen Forces. Furthermore, many young black Namibians have been impressed into the militarization process through a variety of devices applied by the South African army of occupation. This started with the extension of compulsory military service to black Namibians in January 1981, using coercion and huge financial bribes.

124. With the introduction of compulsory military service for all black youth, there has been a growing militarization of the schools, with the students becoming one of the prime targets for conscription. The occupation régime's Department of Education regularly sends out circulars to all schools, instructing principals to register all boys due to reach the age of 16. This is intended to facilitate the call-up process. African teachers have increasingly been seeing their schools taken over by South African soldiers, who have been planted there to try and promote the idea of the South African army as a social benefactor and, what is more and more important, to act as informers.

125. Those black Namibians who, through either economic necessity or other forms of pressure, have been incorporated into the South African military machine of occupation are deployed in one of the tribally-based, paramilitary units known as Home Guards, or in the so-called South West Africa Territory Force. These units have become notorious for atrocities and killings carried out by the South African army against the civilian population in Namibia. In other words, the units are increasingly being used to terrorize the local population. These tribally-based institutions are meant as seeds and fertile ground for civil war for an independent Namibia.

126. That is the extent and nature of South Africa's repugnant attempts to place the Namibian population under Pretoria's brutal and oppressive military domination and permanent control.

127. Another dimension of the militarization process has been the creation of so-called protected villages and fortification of towns, especially in the areas of northern Namibia: Koakoveld in the north-west and Okavango in the north-east.

128. As was the case with the United States war in Viet Nam and the war in Smith's Rhodesia, the strategic aim of the South African army in establishing the protected villages is to try to isolate our guerrilla combatants from the masses of the people and exert the occupation army's total control over the movement of our oppressed people. Nearly every town in these regions is a South African military base; the towns are surrounded by military communication towers and watch-towers equipped with machine-guns dominating the skyline around them.

129. It is precisely because Pretoria has failed to create a credible political alternative for perpetuating its domination of Namibia that the régime is relying more and more on its military and security forces to prolong its occupation of our country. This increasing reliance on the army means also that South Africa's top military brass has taken over the primacy once held by the civilian colonial administrators in influencing Pretoria's policies towards Namibia.

130. Evidence of the powerful influence being exerted on South African policy towards Namibia by the generals began to emerge more clearly last year when Lieutenant-General Pieter van der Westhuizen, Chief of South African military intelligence, General Jan Geldenhuys, Chief of the Army, and General Charles Lloyd, Commanding Officer of the South African forces in Namibia, travelled to Washington on several occasions to discuss the Namibian issue with their Pentagon counterparts.

131. It is believed that it was these generals, working in strategic partnership with the Pentagon establishment, who conceived the so-called linkage issue. They have also played a crucial role in influencing the recent decision by the Botha régime to dump its Turnhalle puppets. The generals felt that the Turnhalle puppet crowd was merely wasting millions of rands without delivering the necessary political goods for Pretoria. The military establishment felt that such money should go to the army to enable it to continue the occupation of Namibia.

132. In short, South Africa's continued militarization of Namibia has transformed large parts of our country into a permanent war zone, and the massive military presence in the country is the key instrument in Pretoria's attempt to perpetuate its control over Namibia as its last buffer zone between the racist State and independent African States to the north.

133. In the face of this colonial tyranny and of the fascistic state terrorism and aggression being perpetrated by the *apartheid* racists against our people, the national resistance of our people has remained firm and their patriotism has never been found wanting. Moreover, the support being given by the oppressed masses of Namibia to SWAPO, the sole and authentic representative of the Namibian people, is ever increasing and deepening. The Turnhalle puppets have been totally rejected by our people. Various bogus constitutional or political entities have fallen under a persistent onslaught by SWAPO and the concerted resistance of the people themselves.

134. As I pointed out earlier, the *apartheid* régime has always considered itself a regional super-Power, regarding the whole of Africa as fair game for its expansionist ambitions and using economic blackmail and military aggression as instruments of its policy.

135. In this context, racist South Africa has, for instance, launched armed aggression, using Namibia as a launching pad, against Angola in the form of a massive military invasion and occupation, which have continued since August 1981. It has also launched military attacks, both directly and indirectly, through its local puppets, against Mozambique, Zambia, Zimbabwe, Lesotho and Seychelles. Angola and Mozambique have become the main arenas of Pretoria's destabilization campaign. There the régime is making extensive use of its surrogates, the so-called Mozambique Resistance Movement, and UNITA, the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola respectively. To this end, the régime has extensively been training, recruiting, financing, arming, transporting, deploying, commanding and rescuing foreign mercenaries and local puppets and bandits to and from these countries.

136. In the case of UNITA, racist South Africa is using its military bases in Namibia and occupied parts of Angolan territory to step up its destabilization activities against Angola. Specifically, the racists are using the air bases at Ondangua, Grootfontein, Runtu, Mpacha, Ruacana and Ohopoho in Namibia to carry out these dastardly acts.

137. What I had affirmed in 1971 before the Council was confirmed a few years later by President José Eduardo Dos Santos, the then Minister for Foreign Affairs of Angola, when he said in February 1976 at Addis Ababa, on the occasion of the twenty-sixth meeting of the Council of Ministers of OAU, devoted to the problem of Angola:

> "On 11 November [*1975*] Angola was invaded by South African forces with the objective of imposing another foreign rule on the Angolan people."

He added:

> "It is our objective to mobilize the masses of Angola to put a stop to this aggression and drive away these aggressive forces which are active in our country in collusion with organizations which have betrayed the Angolan people and Africans as a whole by seeking alliance with South Africa."

138. In other words, the Angolan people were the victims of racist aggression long before the independence of their country. That aggression has since reached astronomical proportions.

139. The Council is fully aware of South Africa's sinister schemes, which have so far prevented the implementation of the United Nations plan endorsed in Council resolution 435 (1978). Since the adoption of that resolution, the Pretoria racist régime has created all kinds of pretexts to frustrate the early independence of Namibia.

140. The characteristic intransigence and prevarication of the régime were manifested clearly during the Geneva pre-implementation meeting held in January 1981. Contrary to the hopes and expectations of the international community that final arrangements would be agreed upon, the Pretoria régime refused to sign a cease-fire agreement with SWAPO and to agree to a date for the emplacement of UNTAG components in Namibia, thus thwarting the implementation process.

141. As is well known, SWAPO, for its part, reiterated its willingness and readiness to sign a cease-fire agreement right then and there and renewed its pledge to cooperate with the Secretary-General and his staff in order to ensure the smooth and peaceful transition of Namibia to independence.

142. The SWAPO delegation is grateful to the Secretary-General for releasing his latest report in good time before the meeting. We have found the report to be serious, honest and straightforward in presenting the developments since the failed Geneva meeting and, particularly, the extraneous and irrelevant issues which have created the present impasse.

143. In this connection, I wish to state that SWAPO fully associates itself with the concluding observations of the Secretary-General's report especially those in the last three paragraphs [*S/15776, paras. 18-20*]. In our view, these paragraphs accurately reflect the current state of affairs and show who is responsible for the impasse.

144. In this connection, SWAPO has accepted the need to protect the white minority and its property because we believe that a future independent Namibia has an obligation to protect all its citizens. It is in this spirit that SWAPO has agreed to consider the proposal containing principles for the Constituent Assembly and the Constitution for an independent Namibia, although we have some serious reservations about the manner in which the text was transmitted to the Secretary-General.

145. On the other hand, in conformity with the mandate I have received from the Central Committee of SWAPO, I should like to state categorically and clearly that our movement, having reviewed the history of the negotiations and the role of the so-called contact group, led by the United States, has concluded that that group has lost proper contact with the letter and spirit of resolution 435 (1978) and that the whole exercise has now turned out ot be a mere rescue operation for the white, racist, illegal occupiers in Namibia. In particular, the Central Committee of SWAPO has singled out the Reagan Administration, which, because of its public embrace of *apartheid* South Africa, has injected into the decolonization process of our country an extraneous issue, by linking the independence of Namibia to the withdrawal of Cuban forces from Angola. The Central Committee categorically rejects and vehemently condemns this unjust, arrogant, irrational and objectionable policy of linkage. The position of SWAPO is that the oppressed people of Namibia are entitled to independence without any further delay, pre-condition or prevarication.

146. It is in the light of this that SWAPO has come to the conclusion that the role of the five Western Powers has ceased to be that of an honest broker in terms of the implementation of Council resolution 435 (1978). These Powers, and the Reagan Administration in particular, must be prevailed upon to desist forthwith from their sinister attempts to hijack and misuse the Namibian negotiating process in their own economic and strategic interests.

147. We are not unmindful of the commendable position taken by the Government of France on the issue of linkage or parallelism, as stated by its Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Claude Cheysson, at the International Conference in Support of the Struggle of the Namibian People for Independence. We urge the other members of the so-called contact group to show that they have the courage of their convictions, otherwise mooted privately, and follow the French example by publicly dissociating themselves from this notorious and unwarranted imposition.

148. Once again we are appearing before the Council and pleading for the adoption of effective, concrete measures against the defiant racist régime of Pretoria. In particular, we call urgently upon the Council to shoulder its primary responsibility in the implementation of the United Nations plan as endorsed in Security Council resolution 435 (1978). It is our strong belief that the United Nations legal authority over Namibia must be ensured through the direct involvement of the Organization in all efforts to secure genuine independence for Namibia. In this connection, it is our considered view that the role of the Secretary-General in all practical arrangements having to do with the implementation of the United Nations plan should be strengthened. For it is the Secretary-General, and he alone, who is charged with this responsibility in terms of resolution 435 (1978)—not the British or any other member of the contact group; they are self-appointed, and therefore I reject what the British representative has just said: that they want to continue their illegal intervention in the question of Namibia.

149. Furthermore, the Council should oblige South Africa to make a firm commitment as to its readiness to sign a cease-fire agreement with SWAPO, as provided for in the United Nations plan, thus paving the way for the implementation process to start. To this end, the Secretary-General should consider initiating immediate contact with the parties to the conflict and report to the Council as may be required.

150. The Namibian people have already suffered for too long, including large-scale massacres of our people during the German occupation on the basis of an imperial extermination order, which resulted in the substantial depopulation of the country. The Council has a special responsibility to take the necessary steps to prevent further acts of genocide against our people.

151. Allow me before concluding to take this opportunity, on behalf of the Central Committee of SWAPO, to express our appreciation to the Secretary-General for his tireless efforts aimed at securing early independence for Namibia. Similarly, our thanks go to the United Nations Council for Namibia, led by our brother, Mr. Paul Lusaka of Zambia, the United Nations specialized agencies for their consistent support of SWAPO and the cause of the Namibian people, and all the indispensable assistance programmes being administered by the Office of the United Nations Commissioner for Namibia, Mr. Mishra.

152. In conclusion, it is our sincere hope and expectation that, at these meetings, the Council will pay full attention to the Paris Declaration on Namibia and the Programme of Action on Namibia adopted by the International Conference in Support of the Struggle of the Namibian People for Independence.[1] We are greatly indebted to all those whose combined efforts ensured the success of the Conference, foremost among them Mr. Moustapha Niasse, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs of Senegal, the Secretary-General, the President of the United Nations Council for Namibia, the Secretary-General of the Conference, and the entire United Nations staff.

153. Finally, I wish that the situation were different and that Namibia's independence had already been achieved, and I wish that I did not have to repeat the following concluding words of my statement before the Council in 1971. But the reality is that these are mere wishes, and therefore I am compelled to repeat those words once again in the face of naked aggression on the part of the racist régime of South Africa:

> "I wish to declare, in the name of the people of Namibia, that unless this august body acts decisively to secure the withdrawal of South Africa from the international Territory of Namibia, we shall have no alternative but to continue the armed struggle with greater intensity. We do not love bloodshed, but when we are dealing with a Government like that of South

Africa, which believes in violence and bloodshed, we must be prepared to meet it on its own terms. Our struggle may be long and protracted; our struggle may be bloody and costly in terms of human life; it is a price we are prepared to pay for our independence." [*1588th meeting, para. 124.*]

154. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): I now call on the representative of Mauritius, who wishes to make a statement as Chairman of the Group of African States at the United Nations for May 1983.

155. Mr. MAUDAVE (Mauritius) (*interpretation from French*): As I had the occasion last Monday to offer the customary good wishes and respects of my delegation to the President of the Council, I shall at the outset discharge my pleasant duty of greeting those among us whose distinguished presence in this gathering imparts special prestige to our work.

156. I first greet the representatives and militants of the Namibian national liberation movement, SWAPO, and its representative, Mr. Sam Nujoma, who have come from their area of operations to make their contribution to these deliberations.

157. My greetings also go to those who, like you Sir, notwithstanding the onerous ministerial and administrative duties they shoulder in their respective capitals, have come to New York to share with us their thoughts on the Namibian problem and on the means to be used to attain our objectives.

158. I also thank the Chairman of the Group of Non-Aligned Countries at the United Nations for having, as a result of the recommendations made at the Seventh Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, held at New Delhi from 7 to 12 March 1983, and in concert with the OAU, requested this meeting of the Council.

159. Finally, I should like to express our appreciation to the Secretary-General who submitted to us a precise, impartial and lucid report on developments as they relate today to Security Council resolution 435 (1978) and 439 (1978) on the Namibian issue [*S/15776*].

160. Two considerations underlie this statement, which will be as relevant and concise as possible. First, out of deference to those who are here as front-line combatants or as ministers or chairmen of various councils or committees on Namibia, it would be better to let them give the Council the details of the different aspects of the problem. Secondly, in view of the number of speakers, it would be better for us to avoid repetition and to have all the necessary time the better to concentrate on action to be taken. The Chairman of the Group of African States at the United Nations therefore plays a role of catalyst here; his function at this stage of our debates is to focus the Council's attention on some specific points. What, for example, is the state of mind of the major parties concerned at this time? What are the obstacles preventing the situation from developing? How are those obstacles perceived? What measures are we going to take to attain our objectives?

161. It is scarcely an exaggeration to say that the feeling prevailing among the Namibians, among the representatives of the front-line States, among the Africans and among the non-aligned is an explosive mixture of frustration and revolt. All those who, from near or from afar, are following with interest the events in southern Africa and cherish the sovereignty of nations, the self-determination of peoples and the promotion of human rights feel the same bitterness. For years now the situation in Namibia has represented a challenge to the will of the international community and to the authority of the United Nations, which has assumed responsibility for this Territory. The sessions of the General Assembly, the International Court of Justice and the Security Council have always proclaimed that the continued presence of the Republic of South Africa in Namibia is illegal. Resolution 435 (1978), which endorses the United Nations plan for Namibia has existed since 1978. It is important to remember and to repeat here that the South African Government has a commitment to that plan. Yet, Namibia is still not free. Today it is not only deprived of its rights to self-determination and to sovereignty by the occupation of its Territory but, under regulations that still derive from the recommendations of the Odendaal Commission, its people are refused the exercise of the basic human rights of every human being, namely, the free enjoyment of life, freedom of movement and freedom to live where one wishes. The Charter of the United Nations acknowledge these rights for all peoples.

162. For some years now, intervention forces have brought desolation and death to the northern plains and the sands of the Kalahari. Beyond the ghettos of straw and corrugated iron of the bantustans, the invasions have plunged the peoples of Angola, Zambia, Zimbabwe, Mozambique and Lesotho into mourning. The recent meeting of the Heads of State or Government of the Non-Aligned Countries at New Delhi and the International Conference in Support of the Struggle of the Namibian People for Independence, held in Paris last month, took stock of these violations while supporting the wave of international indignation that has led to this Council meeting today. This long process of negotiations, frequently interrupted by military interventions in the field, has tested the patience of the international community in general and that of the non-aligned and African States in particular. Throughout this time, the front-line States and SWAPO have displayed great political wisdom and moderation. Notwithstanding their disappointment over the slow pace of the negotiations and their bitterness at seeing themselves targeted by the soldier rabble, they have never stopped exploring all possible means of reaching a peaceful settlement. Out of realism, they have gone so far as to accept the important modifications that resolution 435 (1978) made to the original resolution 385 (1976). They have determinedly talked with the contact group of Western countries in the hope that the pressure that those industrial Powers could exert on South Africa would finally result in the liberation of Namibia. They

are disappointed and bitter. We join them in saying that, after 30 years of weariness and tears, this Council meeting is doubtless the last that may still be able to keep alive this desire for dialogue and moderation. The next time we return to this table, will it be, at best, to take note of another *status quo* or will it be, at worst, to strive to contain the ravages of a generalized conflict? We hope that it will be rather to lay the groundwork for a plan of economic and social recovery for Namibia in the peace that will finally have been achieved.

163. That is the backdrop in the centre of which we are now going to erect the wall of the impasse; and against this wall we are going to set the ladder of the possibilities offered us to climb over it.

164. There are four key elements linked to the development of the situation in southern Africa: the procrastination of Pretoria; the difficulties of implementing our resolutions; the work of the contact group of Western countries; and the concept of parallelism or linkage.

165. Pretoria's attitude *vis-à-vis* Namibia has wavered between arrogant paternalism in the 1950s and deadly aggression in more recent months. The lofty aspirations contained in Article 22 of the covenant of the League of Nations, with euphoric references to well-being, development and the sacred trust of civilization, were flouted from the outset, as have been all the resolutions of the United Nations adopted subsequently.

166. Ever since 1946, South Africa, although a signatory of the Charter of the United Nations a year earlier, has chosen to disregard the provisions of Article 73 on development and of Chapter XII on the international trusteeship system. When a State deliberately chooses to violate the Charter which it helped to draft in 1945 and which bears its signature alongside those of 50 other members of the international community, it commits the first of a series of errors, which paves the way for the excesses which follow: partition of territory, expropriation of fertile lands, establishment of bantustans, anti-terrorist laws, censorship, arbitrary imprisonment, contempt for world opinion, racism, destabilization, invasion—in a word, the infernal concatenation of hatred and violence.

167. The events of last weekend bode ill. We regret this escalation and appeal to all to keep the situation under control as far as is reasonably possible. A situation which could degenerate into a generalized conflict would entail serious risks for security and could indeed ricochet to affect those whom we wish to help regain their freedom in order and with dignity.

168. The Secretary-General devoted a part of his report on the work of the Organization[5] last year to the difficulties the United Nations had been encountering in ensuring the implementation of and compliance with General Assembly and Security Council resolutions. The whittling away of the authority of the United Nations and the weakening of its role in peace-keeping and protecting international security are issues to which we must continue to devote our fullest attention. Within this edifice on the East River we all use the same moral language. Our speeches are packed with references to what is just and what is unjust, to right and to law. We act as advocates of a Kantian ethic of the rights and duties of States and their leaders. Yet, to the categorical imperatives we establish regarding the morality which should prevail in international relations, the champions of a more utilitarian approach reply, like Machiavelli, that there are also considerations of security, national interests and trade. Kant has shown that these notions are far more subjective than those of fundamental rights and justice. There is, therefore, on the one hand, the idealism of the United Nations as to what should be the ethic of international relations and, on the other, the utilitarianism of States, above all the powerful ones, which, while Members of the United Nations, are in fact acting as traitors to what they say is their overriding interest—the rules of this common lexicon, the Charter itself.

169. We can appeal here to the conscience of peoples all over the world. We do not yet have the means to translate that appeal into reality, except gropingly by using the "blue helmets", through committees, by dispatching emissaries and by proposing sanctions. We must search for ways of strengthening the role of the Organization and stopping the whittling away of its authority. While we await international agreements creating a universal jurisdiction and the establishment of a world government with real powers, Namibia, for which we are directly responsible, offers the Organization an opportunity to affirm loud and clear its international responsibilities. A political and constitutional success in the field, this very year if possible, would do far more than all our long speeches to increase the prestige and authority of the United Nations and the Security Council.

170. Opinions are divided as to the role and efficacy of the contact group. Certain people will say that it has replaced the United Nations, whose prestige and authority it has to some extent undermined. In certain circles, it has already been reproached with contributing to delaying the normalization of the situation in southern Africa because there is a fundamental incompatibility between the interest of the industrialized countries in raw materials and the promotion of human rights. Others contend that it has shown itself much more concerned about the mineral resources of Namibia, sardines and lobsters, financial networks, stock market movements and repercussions on employment in its member countries than about national independence, distributive justice, elections or internal security.

171. The representative of the United Kingdom has just spoken to us of the more positive aspects of the contact group's mission. The thesis of an indirect approach has the advantage of offering the possibility of effective action where it is obvious that the high moral tone of resolutions adopted here in New York is ineffective in Pretoria. As part of the progressive pressure that must be brought to bear to demolish the wall of arrogance and

oppression, the participation of groups remains important for two reasons: to replace and to complement. These groups, first and foremost, have a more significant role to play through their financial networks, their scientific and technical organizations, their control of the communication systems and the media, the extent and the interdependence of their trade and their supply of strategic equipment. They can immediately and by intelligent use of their means of persuasion make the content of our resolutions felt by the recalcitrants. In certains cases, to reach into people's pocketbooks is to reach more easily their reasoning powers, if not their hearts.

172. An objective analysis of the development of the multinationals and private or State banks over the last 10 years suggests the outline of a more socially aware reorientation in the business sector. To be sure, business, money, a positive balance-sheet, remain the major objectives, but these companies have already got into the habit of taking into account considerations other than those of profit so far as their internal strategies are concerned—not because of altruism but because of prudence. In the long run, as Stanley Hoffmann has written in *Duties beyond Borders:* "doing business with gross violators of human rights may lead to upheavals which entail far greater losses than the short-term ones"[6] invoked by the defenders of unbridled commercialism. The States of the contact group can, if they really wish to do so, continue to help us by using their influence in a positive manner. Better that than eventually having to resort to sanctions, whose implementation would be difficult and whose consequences might be even more disastrous for the deprived people whom we wish to save.

173. In South Africa and Namibia, State enterprises belonging to the contact group, Stanley Hoffmann continues, "do not have to choose only between participating in and profiting from *apartheid*, and disinvesting. They can try to promote employment, housing and health policies that undermine *apartheid*." At the opening of the International Conference in Support of the Struggle of the Namibian People for Independence, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of one of the member countries of the contact group put it as follows:

> "Not a single military product, not a single spare part, has been or will be delivered to the country of *apartheid*; no facilities will be accorded by the Government to those who wish to continue to maintain relations with that country; thus, our trade plummeted by 18 per cent between 1981 and 1982."

Is this not an example to be followed, and is it not food for thought for the other four members of the contact group?

174. Kahlil Gibran, a charismatic and visionary poet of the beginning of the century, sums up in verse what has been said about the responsibility of nations:

> "You give but little when you give of your possessions.
>
> It is when you give of yourself that you truly give."*

175. Let us now move to the concept of parallelism, or linkage. No sooner had the contact group devised a three-stage plan, accepted with their customary moderation and sense of reality by SWAPO and the front-line States; no sooner had everything seemed in readiness for the implementation of resolution 435 (1978) and for Namibia's swift accession to independence, than other demands and considerations were introduced that had nothing to do with the problem in question. As the President of the United Nations Council for Namibia has rightly reminded us, it is not acceptable for the Namibian people to serve as hostage to oblige certain neighbouring countries to revise their foreign policy or to reassess the security agreements which they had freely entered into with neighbouring countries. After all, it is not Angola that is invading South Africa. It has neither the means nor the desire for it. It is far more interested in its economic recovery and in the establishment of secure borders than in arousing the ire of its swashbuckling neighbours. Africa, the non-aligned countries and right-minded people the world over are indignant that a commitment to the withdrawal of support forces has been made a pre-condition for the independence of Namibia. To be sure, we all feel it desirable for a country's security to be insured without recourse to foreign forces. Nevertheless, it is up to each country to decide for itself and in full sovereignty the means it deems useful to reinforce and to guarantee its security. To my knowledge, the contact group has never expressed the need for the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola before neighbouring Namibia was assured of its accession to independence. We must all be guided by the very clear-cut criteria stipulated in resolution 435 (1978), because the incoherence that grows out of the introduction of considerations other than those of human rights into the settlement of the Namibian question destroys the moral fibre of the principles the Security Council itself has proclaimed.

176. This concept of linkage stems from a Manichean view of international relations and offers to a State guilty of violations in Namibia, of invasions of Angola and of destabilization elsewhere in Africa the possibility of resisting the pressures we wish to bring to bear upon it. Rather than an explicit linkage, which has only slim chances of success and which can only delay the outcome desired by all the members of the Council who wrote and adopted resolution 435 (1978), I propose a more subtle blackmail which would put it as follows: "We are going to step up progressively all manner of pressure upon you. Our public opinion and the world conscience oppose racism and the illegal occupation of Namibian territory. We will relax this pressure only when you do something for human rights."

177. The Charter, let us recall, is a basic document, since it was adopted by all nations and mentions the promotion of universal respect for human rights

* Quoted in English by the speaker.

amongst its essential purposes and principles. Human rights as a policy, which in essence is controversial, poses the problem of adjusting national priorities to internationally sanctioned moral imperatives. The choice between a crusade for freedom and democracy and the protection of material interests or security requires of nations not a Promethean posture of agony, but rather the transcendence of a Sisyphus rolling his boulder. There is no way to isolate oneself from the effects of massive human rights violations committed elsewhere. Transcendence brings us closer to the Kantian ideal of the moral political man in the city, or of the rational political analysts such as we here, whose duty it is gradually to turn the infernal cycle of revolt and oppressive measures into an upward spiral towards the establishment of a new order, less inhuman and less unjust. In the case of Namibia, before us today, as in the case of other acts of aggression throughout the world, I should like to quote Sandy Vogelgesang who, in a book entitled *American Dream—Global Nightmare*, wrote the following: "There is nothing new about man's inhumanity to man. . . . What is new is the known scale of violations."[7]

178. In southern Africa, the risk of a vicious circle of repression and violence is evident. Worse yet, this situation is liable to spread and sooner or later to engulf the whole continent.

179. I shall sum up this statement by stressing that we must go on with the collective action that we are engaged in here, so that we might set up a democratically elected government within an independent and sovereign Namibia, free from all interference in its domestic affairs. This collective action, placed under the lofty authority of the United Nations, which bears direct and primary responsibility, does not rule out complementary pressures that could be brought to bear by other authorities. In paragraph 18 of his report, the Secretary-General voices the opinion that, as far as the United Nations is concerned, the only outstanding issues are the choice of the electoral system and the settlement of some final problems relating to UNTAG and its composition. To remove the concept of linkage would considerably reduce the obstacles in the path of implementation of resolution 435 (1978).

180. I have earlier quoted Kahlil Gibran. May I, in conclusion, once again borrow from one of his poems to illustrate the futility of oppression which would silence in Namibia or elsewhere the song of liberty:

> "You delight in laying down laws,
>
> Yet you delight more in breaking them.
>
> . . .
>
> You can muffle the drum, and you can loosen the strings of the lyre,
>
> but who shall command the skylark not to sing?"*

* Quoted in English by the speaker.

181. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): The next speaker is Mr. Moustapha Niasse, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Senegal and Chairman of the International Conference in Support of the Struggle of the Namibian People for Independence. I welcome him and invite him to take a place at the Council table and to make his statement.

182. Mr. NIASSE (Senegal) (*interpretation from French*): Allow me, first of all, on behalf of President Diouf, Head of State of Senegal, on behalf of our delegation and on my own behalf to congratulate you, Sir, most warmly on your assumption of the presidency of the Council for the month of May 1983. Because of the long-standing links of friendship and close co-operation existing between our two Heads of State and between your country, Zaire, and mine, Senegal, my delegation is delighted to see you presiding over the Council, which is once again discussing the question of Namibia, a problem that is of the greatest concern not only to Africa because it is directly involved but also to the international community as a whole. My delegation is convinced that, thanks to your talents as a seasoned diplomat and your broad experience of international affairs, the discussions in the Council will be crowned with success.

183. I should also like to avail myself of this opportunity to pay a well-deserved tribute to the outgoing President, Mrs. Jeane J. Kirkpatrick, representative of the United States of America, for the praiseworthy manner in which she led the Council debates during the past month of April.

184. Finally, I should like to thank you and the other members of the Council most sincerely for the honour bestowed upon us by inviting the delegation of Senegal to take part in the discussion on this important item on the agenda of the current series of meetings. In so doing, the Council is again making it possible for Senegal to make its contribution to the quest for a solution to the Namibian problem, the continuation of which remains a grave threat to international peace and security.

185. Africa is grateful to you for the diligence with which you convened the Council to consider once again the Namibian problem, and that you did so following the explicit recommendations of the Seventh Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries and of the International Conference in Support of the Struggle of the Namibian People for Independence.

186. As members know, I had the great honour and privilege of presiding—on behalf of my country and with the trust placed in me by my colleagues—over the Paris Conference on Namibia, organized pursuant to General Assembly resolution 37/233 C of 20 December 1982.

187. I do not intend to go into the background of the Namibian problem, the details of which are known to all, nor do I wish to dwell on the situation in Namibia itself. That situation which, owing to the strengthening of the oppressive and repressive *apartheid* régime, has been characterized by serious and disquieting developments has

been debated in depth on other occasions, especially at Harare, at the meeting of Heads of State of the front-line States in February 1983, at New Delhi in March, in Paris in April, and at Dar-es-Salaam during the current month.

188. As the Security Council knows, the International Conference in Support of the Struggle of the Namibian People for Independence adopted, at the end of its work, two documents of crucial importance: the Paris Declaration on Namibia and the Programme of Action on Namibia.[1] Those two documents, which, in our view, are an important step in the struggle of the Namibian people to regain its independence, were, we must emphasize, adopted unanimously by the Conference which brought together in Paris some 140 countries, most of which were represented at the ministerial level.

189. In order to facilitate the debates of the Council and enable it, in accordance with the expressed wish of the international community assembled in Paris, to take the necessary measures to find a final solution to the Namibian problem, I shall outline the conclusions of the Paris Conference and the main points of the two documents to which I have just referred.

190. First of all, I would point out that, over and above its outright condemnation of the *apartheid* régime in South Africa and its racist, illegal policy of occupation of Namibia, the Conference focused on determining the reasons which have thus far impeded the implementation of Security Council resolution 435 (1978) and on proposing concrete measures in this connection.

191. Indeed, both the Paris Declaration and the Programme of Action emphasize the measures that should be taken so as finally to enable Namibia to achieve independence, with all its territory, including, of course, Walvis Bay, the Penguin Islands and all the other islands situated off the Namibian coast.

192. The Conference was also an occasion for the international community to renew, on the one hand, its active solidarity and its moral, political and material support for SWAPO, the sole legitimate representative of the Namibian people and, on the other, to stigmatize once again the iniquitous policy of the illegal occupation of Namibia by South Africa and the repeated acts of aggression by the racist régime of Pretoria against the front-line States, especially the People's Republic of Angola.

193. Above and beyond the internationally accepted principles which it recalls in unequivocal terms, the Paris Declaration is a historic document of incontestable political scope.

194. By that Declaration, the Conference solemnly reaffirms the inalienable right of the people of Namibia to self-determination and national independence in a united Namibia, in accordance with its legitimate aspirations and the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations.

195. Furthermore, the Declaration emphasizes that, pursuant to General Assembly resolutions 2145 (XXI) and 2248 (S-V) of 27 October 1966 and 19 May 1967 respectively, Namibia is the direct responsibility of the United Nations which, in terminating South Africa's Mandate in 1966, vested administrative and legal authority for the Territory in the United Nations Council for Namibia until that country achieves independence.

196. The Declaration unequivocally condemns the persistent defiant attitude of South Africa towards the international community, as well as its systematic refusal to comply with the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly and the Security Council. In this context, the Declaration also condemns the dilatory tactics of the South African régime, which is seeking through unacceptable political subterfuges to impose an internal solution to a problem the international nature of which was once again emphasized by the Conference.

197. The Declaration denounces South Africa's military build-up and the consolidation of its nuclear capability, which constitutes a genuine threat to the African continent and all mankind.

198. In this regard, the Declaration deplored the violation of and non-compliance with the arms embargo imposed by the Security Council, especially in its resolution 418 (1977), and severely criticized the attitude of certain countries and financial institutions which, flouting decisions of the international community, continued to lend all kinds of assistance to the Pretoria régime.

199. The Declaration also deplored the so-called policy of constructive engagement of certain industrialized countries *vis-à-vis* South Africa whose régime was benefiting from their understanding, and rejected categorically any link that might introduce an East-West dimension into the question of Namibia.

200. The Conference felt, indeed, that the question is and remains a problem of decolonization, which should be settled on the basis of the relevant provisions of the Charter of the United Nations and General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960, containing the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples.

201. Those, briefly, are the major points contained in the Declaration which the Conference recommends to the urgent and close attention of all Governments, organizations and peoples committed to peace and justice, in order to produce measures that might quickly free Namibia from the illegal occupation imposed upon it by the racist Pretoria régime.

202. As for the Programme of Action, we need simply point out that the Conference, pending the imposition of comprehensive mandatory sanctions by the Security Council, urged States unilaterally and collectively to adopt economic measures against the South African régime as called for in the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly.

203. The Programme of Action adopted by the Conference involves certain major points that can be summed up as follows.

204. First, the immediate imposition of comprehensive mandatory sanctions against South Africa as provided for in Chapter VII of the Charter.

205. Secondly, the tightening of the arms embargo against South Africa and a total boycott of the Pretoria régime in conformity with the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly.

206. Thirdly, an appeal to the United Kingdom Government to prohibit the export of radar equipment to South Africa.

207. Fourthly, strict compliance with Decree No. 1 for the Protection of the Natural Resources of Namibia[3] and the immediate cessation of the shameless plundering of the natural resources, including uranium, of the Territory by industrialized countries whose companies and economic interest groups continue to operate in Namibia.

208. Fifthly, sustained and increased moral and political support, as well as financial, military and other material assistance, to SWAPO and to other front-line States members of the South African Development Co-ordination Conference.

209. Sixthly, the strengthening of the powers of the United Nations Council for Namibia as the legal Administering Authority for Namibia until its independence.

210. Whether in the Declaration or in the Programme of Action, which I have just summarized, the Conference was unanimous in acknowledging that Security Council resolution 435 (1978) was the only acceptable and valid basis for a peaceful settlement of the Namibian question. The Conference consequently calls for its immediate implementation, without any modification whatsoever.

211. The illegal occupation of Namibia by South Africa, in the eyes of the international community meeting in Paris and in accordance with the Definition of Aggression set forth in General Assembly resolution 3314 (XXIX), of 14 December 1974, is an act of aggression against the Namibian people. Hence, the Conference believes that the situation as it prevails in Namibia is a serious threat to international peace and security.

212. In this regard, the Conference expressed its dismay at the failure of the Security Council to implement its own resolutions, thereby encouraging South Africa to pursue its policy of *apartheid*, occupation and aggression in southern Africa in defiance of the international community. For that reason, the Conference urges the Council, in its wisdom, to consider the Namibian question in the light of the conclusions of the Conference and to exercise, within that framework, its full authority to bring about the implementation of its resolutions 385 (1976) and 435 (1978), in order to enable Namibia, which has suffered so sorely under the yoke of *apartheid*, to join the concert of free and independent nations, in accordance with its legitimate aspirations, without delay.

213. Moreover, South Africa, as the Council knows, continues its repeated attacks against the dignity and independence of the sovereign people of Angola, with whom we here reaffirm our brotherly solidarity.

214. The international community asks the Council, in a spirit of generosity and in order to restore to the Namibians their human dignity and to enable them, as is their right, to drink at the well of liberty at long last restored to them, to carry out effectively and faithfully the responsibilities entrusted to it by the Charter, in order to contribute to redressing a flagrant injustice against a people whose only wrong is to aspire, like others, to freedom and dignity. In so doing, the Council will spare Africa and the entire world the danger of an intensification of an armed conflict that could once again imperil international peace and security.

215. That is the message that I, as President of the International Conference in Support of the Struggle of the Namibian People for Independence, and on behalf of the Head of State of Senegal, felt it my duty to transmit to the Council, in the hope that it will facilitate the Council's deliberations and enable it to take the steps the world community has the right to expect of it.

216. I should like to avail myself of this opportunity to thank most sincerely the entire international community for being kind enough to honour my country, Senegal, by appointing it to the presidency of that important international meeting in Paris, which marked a crucial step in the process of negotiations aimed at finding a peaceful solution to the question of Namibia. I should like to reaffirm the constant readiness of my country and of its leaders to extend as in the past, our active co-operation in the search for a negotiated solution to the Namibian problem.

217. My delegation indeed remains convinced, as was stated by the Head of State of Senegal at the eighteenth session of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the OAU, held at Nairobi in June 1981, that it is still possible to make Namibia independent through a negotiated solution based on the proper and comprehensive implementation of resolution 435 (1978).

218. In that context, I must emphasize that the question of Namibia is an international problem that is still before the United Nations, and that it is within this framework that, in accordance with the wishes of the international community and of SWAPO itself, we should find a solution to it. Within that same framework, it would be particularly appropriate to strengthen the authority of the Secretary-General and that of the United Nations Council for Namibia.

219. Five years have elapsed since the adoption by the Security Council of resolution 435 (1978). Since the

desired objective, namely, the independence of Namibia, has not been achieved, it is only right that today the Council should once again have that issue before it so that it may undertake a new evaluation of the situation and, at the same time, in the light of the conclusions of the Paris Conference, formulate the most appropriate ways and means of ensuring the implementation of resolutions 385 (1976) and 435 (1978), which, despite the passage of time, retain their intrinsic value and continue to be the most acceptable basis for a negotiated settlement of the Namibian problem.

220. The Western countries members of the contact group, whose efforts we encourage, have a direct and special responsibility in the Namibian issue and a vanguard role to play in the settlement of the question of Namibia. However, they must demonstrate greater firmness with regard to South Africa in order to compel it to accept and implement the terms of the United Nations settlement plan. If we wish to avoid a widespread conflict, with all the unpredictable consequences it might involve, that is the only way for Namibia to regain its independence and for southern Africa finally to enjoy a new era of peace, security and calm in which to turn its attention to its own development.

221. I should like to pay a well-deserved tribute to the Secretary-General for the very diligent way in which he has tackled the Namibian problem since taking office. The introductory report that he submitted at the beginning of this meeting reflects his concern for objectivity and frankness, his realism and his honesty. The delegation of Senegal would like to encourage him to maintain his contact with all the parties concerned and to pursue his praiseworthy efforts until the achievement of total independence by Namibia.

222. We also congratulate Mr. Paul Lusaka, the President of the United Nations Council for Namibia, and Mr. Brajesh Mishra, the United Nations Commissioner for Namibia and Secretary-General of the International Conference in Support of the Struggle of the Namibian People for Independence, for their tireless efforts on behalf of the independence of Namibia and the success of the Conference. If the Conference was a success, we must emphasize that it was thanks to their dedication and their devotion to the just cause of the oppressed peoples, including the brotherly Namibian people.

223. Finally, I should like to welcome here the presence among us of an African brother, a great fighter, determined and clear-minded, and a great leader, our comrade, Sam Nujoma, whose organization, SWAPO, the sole and authentic representative of the Namibian people, has won the admiration and respect of the international community because of its discipline, its spirit of initiative, its open-mindedness, its manifest willingness to co-operate and its keen sense of responsibility—in a word, because of the political maturity it has shown up to the present.

224. I assure him once again of the unequivocal support of Senegal and reiterate that my delegation will spare no effort to enable SWAPO to make the true voice of its people heard and to help Namibia enter the concert of free and independent nations.

225. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): The last speaker is the representative of the Chairman of the Special Committee against *Apartheid*, Mr. Mohamed Sahnoun. I invite him to take a place at the Council table and to make his statement.

226. Mr. SAHNOUN: Mr. President, I should like to thank you and the members of the Council for the kind invitation extended to the Special Committee against *Apartheid*, on whose behalf I have the honour to speak now.

226. Allow me also, on behalf of the Special Committee to say that we are confident that, under your wise and very able leadership, the Council will be greatly aided in the fulfilment of its important responsibilities.

228. The Council is called upon once more to deal with the question of Namibia at a time when South Africa, instead of relinquishing its stranglehold over the Territory of Namibia and co-operating in the implementation of resolutions 385 (1976) and 435 (1978), has in fact embarked on a dangerous policy aimed at imposing its diktat on Namibia and on several neighbouring independent African States, which it has since 1973 subjected to a series of premeditated acts of aggression and destabilization by overt and covert means—a series of acts that are tantamount to a devastating undeclared war on the front-line States. Today's aggression against Mozambique is a further example of this treacherous, inhuman and dangerous policy.

229. In April, the Special Committee sent a fact-finding mission to the front-line States, which I had the privilege to lead. It received extensive information on the sharp increase in the number of military operations carried out in broad daylight by South African forces, especially in Angola, Mozambique and Lesotho, as well as covert activities involving border incidents, psychological warfare and the use of subversive groups and mercenaries, assassination and abduction of individuals and destruction of bridges, roads, rail lines, oil pipelines, fuel depots and power lines in several neighbouring countries.

230. Using the international Territory of Namibia as a springboard, the South African régime has occupied southern Angola. The murderous activities of its military forces in Namibia and Angola have already claimed over 10,000 victims and sent hundreds of thousands of displaced persons streaming into neighbouring countries, thus adding to the strains of the host countries. Between 1975 and 1981, material damage to the Angolan economy alone was estimated at over $7.5 billion.

231. All these criminal acts of aggression and destabilization point in one direction, that is, the determination of the racist régime of Pretoria to impose a solution of its own in Namibia as well as in the rest of the southern

Africa region. This is a flagrant violation of the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and of every norm of international law and conduct and a total disregard for the decisions of the General Assembly and the Council. This open challenge to the Organization cannot be left unanswered.

232. The Special Committee has been and continues to be deeply concerned about the economic interests that stand in the way of Namibian independence, those very interests that prevent the implementation of resolution 435 (1978), in addition to the political and military interests.

233. It is well known that transnational corporations, through capital investment, bank loans and trade, have abetted the *apartheid* régime not only in South Africa but in Namibia itself. It is no accident that, as early as 1974, the United Nations Council for Namibia, as legal Administering Authority of the international Territory until independence, enacted Decree No. 1 for the Protection of the Natural Resources of Namibia[3] against further usurpation by the *apartheid* régime and its allies.

234. In the same vein, General Assembly resolution 36/51 of 24 December 1981 demanded that the Pretoria régime and its collaborators desist from their shameless exploitation of Namibia's resources and called on the international community to bring pressure to bear on transnational corporations to refrain from exploitative activities. However, available information reveals that there are as many as 88 corporations operating in Namibia now. The operations of these corporations are made possible by means of licences issued by the Pretoria régime, which is illegally administering Namibia. In 1981 alone, South Africa approved more than 250 mineral prospecting licences to international mining companies. Approximately 80 per cent of the total mining assets are held by only three mining companies. The first is Consolidated Diamond Mines of South West Africa; the second is Tsumeb Corporation, controlled by American Metal Climax and Newmont Mining Corporation of the United States; and the third is Rössing Uranium, in which the largest stake, nearly 47 per cent, is held by the Rio Tinto Zinc Corporation of the United Kingdom.

235. It is also well known that the *apartheid* régime has derived military gains from its transnational corporation partners. They have enabled its State-owned Arms and Development Corporation to produce arms and arms-related *matériel* to the extent that South Africa today rates tenth in the world in the manufacture of conventional weapons—those very weapons which are used by the racist régime to stifle the legitimate aspirations of the people of Namibia to freedom and independence, perpetrate the Matola massacre, carry out a raid against Maseru and attempt to destabilize the front-line States and challenge the community of nations.

236. The situation in Namibia today is certainly worse than it was two years ago, when the Council last met to examine the question in the wake of the abortive Geneva negotiations.

237. It is quite apparent now that attempts to move negotiations away from the framework of resolutions 385 (1976) and 435 (1978) have not only been counter-productive but have also been used by South Africa's major trading partners as a means of muting criticism and delaying or avoiding any action conducive to genuine self-determination and independence.

238. In fact, that is why references to linkage and the so-called partiality of the Organization have cropped up from time to time during those separate negotiations outside the framework of resolution 435 (1978).

239. It is high time that the Council reasserted itself in the fulfilment of its important responsibilities. It owes it to itself, first, to reassert that there can be no satisfactory negotiated settlement of the question of Namibia outside the international consensus embodied in its resolutions 385 (1976) and 435 (1978); secondly, to reject any linkage between Namibian independence and some other extraneous and totally irrelevant matter; and, thirdly, to consider the imposition of selective or comprehensive sanctions against South Africa under Chapter VII of the Charter as a means of ensuring South Africa's compliance with United Nations decisions on Namibia. The Council also owes it to itself to look into ways and means of moving away from the deadlocked positions in which it has found itself on this question that involves the maintenance of international peace and security. The efforts made in this connection by the Secretary-General, which are described in his interim report, should be not only commended but also supported and strengthened by courageous and appropriate decisions of the Council.

240. There is no other way out of the dangerous and explosive situation in which we find ourselves today. This explosive situation, which has been created by South Africa's continuous occupation of Namibia, was stressed by the International Conference in Support of the Struggle of the Namibian People for Independence, held in Paris, when it said: the United Nations and the international community must take energetic and concerted action in support of the legitimate struggle of the Namibian people for self-determination, freedom and national independence. Failure to act now will not only prolong the injustice and oppression under which the people of Namibia have for so long laboured but will lead to the escalation of the present conflict.[8]

241. It is incumbent upon the Council effectively to assist the struggling people of Namibia to achieve genuine self-determination and independence and avoid escalation of the conflict.

The meeting rose at 7.35 p.m.

NOTES

[1] See *Report of the International Conference in Support of the Struggle of the Namibian People for Independence, Paris, 25-29 April 1983* (A/CONF.120/13), part three.

[2] *Ibid.*, para. 170.

[3] See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-fifth Session, Supplement No. 24*, vol. I, annex II.

[4] For the response from the International Court of Justice, see *Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1971*, p. 16.

[5] *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-seventh Session, Supplement No. 1.*

[6] Stanley Hoffmann, *Duties beyond Borders* (New York, Syracuse University Press, 1981), p. 132.

[7] Sandy Vogelgesang, *American Dream—Global Nightmare* (W. W. Norton, New York, 1980), p. 51.

[8] See *Report of the International Conference in Support of the Struggle of the Namibian People for Independence, Paris, 25-29 April 1983* (A/CONF.120/13), part three, para. 191.

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